Ph D R 47 N149

ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD'S ANALYSIS OF THE COGNITIVE FUNCTION OF RELIGIOUS INTUITION

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Faculty of the Graduate School
University of Southern California

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

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by
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June 1947

Ph D R 47 N149

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Rec'd 6416

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PREFACE

The dissertation is a study of the cognitive function of religious [illegible] in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. The problem can be stated in the form of two basic [illegible] religious propositions genuine, i.e., attaining the status of valid knowledge? By [illegible] religious language convey meaning?

There are, and always have been, a large number of philosophers who regard such a study as of dubious value, and who look upon the author with condescension, if not with suspicion. Among many keen minds, beyond the pale of professional philosophy, there is widespread suspicion as to the legitimacy of [illegible] religious inquiry. The common mood of [illegible] relegate religion to the world of poetry, and seek knowledge through scientific methodology. The [illegible] described and criticized by Thomas [illegible]

> 'Poetry [illegible] we understand;' such will be the reflection, spoken or unspoken, of the most cultivated men. . . . Poetry has a truth of its own, and so has religion--a truth which we feel, though from the scientific point of view we may admit it to be an illusion. . . . Better trust poetry and religion to the hold which, however illusive, they will always have on the human heart, than seek to explain and vindicate them, as against science, by help of a philosophy which is itself not only an illusion

PREFACE

The dissertation is a study of the cognitive function of religious intuition in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. The problem can be stated in the form of two basic questions: to what extent are religious propositions genuine, i.e., attaining the status of valid knowledge? By what processes does religious language convey meaning?

There are, and always have been, a large number of philosophers who regard such a study as of dubious value, and who look upon the author with condescension, if not with suspicion. Among many keen minds, beyond the pale of professional philosophy, there is widespread suspicion as to the legitimacy of such religious inquiry. The common mood of our times is to relegate religion to the world of poetry, and seek knowledge through scientific methodology. The mood is ably described and criticized by Thomas Hill Green:

> 'Poetry we feel, science we understand;' such will be the reflection, spoken or unspoken, of the most cultivated men. . . . 'Poetry has a truth of its own, and so has religion--a truth which we feel, though from the scientific point of view we may admit it to be an illusion. . . . Better trust poetry and religion to the hold which, however illusive, they will always have on the human heart, than seek to explain and vindicate them, as against science, by help of a philosophy which is itself not only an illusion

> but a dull and pretentious one, with no interest for the imagination and no power over the heart.[1]

Undoubtedly religious language is often surcharged with emotion. Some passages of religious literature may quietly calm the restive spirit; others may stridently call the pilgrim to his quest. Yet before conclusions are arrived at, two observations would seem to be in order. First, religion, like scientific discipline, occurs on many levels, not one. Second, to equate the whole of religion with what, in some cases, appears to be its emotional overtones seems an instance of faulty generalization. Thus to claim that the meaning of religious language is wholly emotional is too simple an assertion.

The reference of scientific language is external to the self. But the external reference of this language does not necessarily mean that it is employed without the use of constitutive emotional factors. Feelings expressed in language can be disciplined and sublimated for the latter's role in the development of scientific knowledge. Such appears to be the evidence presented by the history of science. Illustrative of the importance of emotion in the pursuit of knowledge, Whitehead writes:

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[1] T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1906), pp. 2 f.

> It is not true, however, that we observe best when we are entirely devoid of emotion. Unless there is a direction of interest, we do not observe at all. Further, our capacity for observation is limited. Accordingly, when we are observing some things, we are in a bad position for observing other things.[2]

It is apparent that the distinction between thought and emotion is not a clear, but is, rather, a confused issue. Separating them into altogether separate strands would appear to be a way to further confound the problem. Alfred North Whitehead is one of the few thinkers of this century who has attempted to clarify this confused relationship. Professor Whitehead's treatment of thought, emotion, and language will be the basis of this inquiry into the cognitive function of religious intuition.[3]

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[2] A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926), p. 124.

[3] This inquiry presupposes an understanding of Whitehead's philosophical method and of his theory of knowledge. These two important aspects of his thought are developed in Chapters I and II. Chapter III relates his theory of religious intuition to his fully developed system in order to give a more complete account of his religious epistemology. Chapter IV explicates his theory of language, which explication serves to expand Whitehead's rather cryptic treatment of the linguistic expression of religious experience. Chapter V develops several major implications of Professor Whitehead's analysis.

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CHAPTER I

THE FUNCTION OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

I. "THE FUNCTION OF REASON"

Professor Whitehead claims that the ". . . function of Reason is to promote the art of life."[1] Reason asserts itself both above and within the world, thus having two functions. Corresponding to these two functions are the Greek figures, Plato and Ulysses. The speculative function of reason is that of Plato who shares reason with the gods; the practical function of reason is that of Ulysses who shares it with the foxes.

Scientific methodology according to Whitehead, is of the nature of Ulysses for it seeks a method of action. Within the sphere of its interest, science is nearly "infallible" in selecting its methods but it is almost "invariably" wrong in formulating judgments of understanding. In studying a subject matter different from that of the sciences, it is important to remember that,

> The man with a method good for purposes of his dominant interests, is a pathological case in respect to his wider judgment on the coordination of this method with a more complete experience. . . Some of the major

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[1] A. N. Whitehead, The Function of Reason (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1929), p. 2.

> disasters of mankind have been produced by the narrowness of men with a good methodology. Ulysses has no use for Plato, and the bones of his companions are strewn on many a reef and many an isle.[2]

However, these two functions of reason are not only separate but they may aid one another. This is especially true in the sciences of the last 150 years; until this time practical reason had largely been the instrument of the sciences. At the beginning of the nineteenth century these two forms of reason made contact. The combination of methodology and theoretic activity brought great progress in man's scientific thinking. The chief problem in discovering the fruitfulness of speculative endeavor lies in breaking the traditional hold of practical methodology. The fixed habits of any culture form a "massive obscurantism" against new developments. The place the Church held in blocking the advance of the new scientific interests is now taken, according to Whitehead, by science itself. "Today scientific methods are dominant, and scientists are the obscurantists."[3] Scientific development came through the impulse of speculative reason and the scientific methods evolved were tentative in contrast to the dogmatic habits of the metaphysicians. With the success of Newtonian physics, science turned a methodology into an anti-metaphysical creed. Theology and mathematics share the blame for introducing the dogmatic method of thinking into European thought. This separation of science and philosophy was, is, and will always be a disastrous mode of thinking, according to Whitehead. Creative advance in either area will come when this bifurcation is rejected. Speaking of the contemporary scene, he claims,

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[2] __Ibid__., p. 8.

[3] __Ibid__., p. 35.

> We have now come to a critical period of the general reorganization of categories of scientific thought. Also sciences, such as psychology and physiology, are hovering on the edge of the crevass separating science from philosophy.
>
> The obscurantist attitude of science is likely to be disastrous in retarding progress. It may be that we are not yet ready to effect a closer union between speculative thought and scientific method . . . The rejection of any source of evidence is always treason to that ultimate rationalism, which urges forward science and philosophy alike.[4]

The nature of reason is both methodological and speculative. Practical reason more often shows ". . . the refusal to speculate freely on the limitations of traditional methods."[5] Theoretical reason is "the organ of novelty" and "The secret of progress is the speculative interest in abstract schemes of morphology."[6] Whitehead's task as a thinker is like that of Plato, the erection of speculative schemes of philosophy bringing novel vision and creative value to the world. Through a discovery of speculative reason Ulysses may be brought home to live an integrated civilized life and upon his return, though still wracked by a craving for adventure, he is satisfied by Adventures of Ideas.

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[4] *Ibid*., p. 50.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 34.

[6] *Ibid*., p. 58.

II. THE NATURE OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

By the concept of speculative philosophy, Whitehead means: ". . . the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every item of our experience can be interpreted."[7] Everything of which we are conscious has the character of particular instance in a logical scheme. The nature of such a scheme can be grasped by an analysis of the important words of the definition. This scheme is to be (1) "coherent," i. e. the fundamental ideas of such a scheme presuppose each other; these ideas are incapable of being abstracted from each other. The idea of coherence intends that no entity can be conceived in complete abstraction from the universe. The aim of speculative philosophy is to exhibit this truth. (2) "Logical," in terms of its use in the definition of speculative philosophy, has its ordinary meaning. (3) The interpretation of every item of experience should be "applicable" and "adequate." "Applicable" means that some items of experience are interpretable and "adequate" means that there are no items incapable of such interpretation. A speculative philosophy has two sides: a rational, which includes the terms, "coherent" and "logical," and an empirical which is expressed by "applicable" and "adequate." These two sides can be bound together by careful consideration and expansion of the term, "adequate." The adequacy of a scheme does not mean that it is adequate over only such items as have been considered. "It means that the texture of observed experience, as illustrating the philosophic scheme, is such that all related experience must exhibit the same texture."[8] (4) A philosophical scheme is "necessary" in the sense of bearing within itself its own justification of universality through all experience. This latter point is true only if one confines himself to "that which communicates with immediate matters of fact." This limitation of universality to what is knowable means that ". . . there is an essence to the universe which forbids relationships beyond itself, as a violation of its rationality. Speculative philosophy seeks that essence."[9]

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[7] A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929), p. 4.

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

III. THE METHOD OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

The inductive method is used as a foil by which the method of speculative philosophy is explicated. It is true that the inductive method, which is one of a systematization of detailed discrimination of antecedent observation, cannot give us metaphysics. But further, he claims that the inability of this method to provide metaphysical knowledge is not limited to the quest for metaphysical knowledge. "In natural science this rigid method is the Baconian method of induction, a method which, if consistently pursued, would have left science where it found it."[10] The difficulty with the method of rigid empiricism is that it omits the play of free imagination restricted only by the requirements of logic and coherence. When the method of difference fails in logic, imaginative thought supplies a difference which direct observation is unable to define. There are two conditions for the success of imaginative constructions: (1) a construction must have its origin in particular factors in topics of human interest. Human interests are as broad as human experience. Thus religions and ethics are suitable topics for philosophical generalization. There must be an applicability of the results of the generalization beyond the locus of origination. If a generalization in physics, for example, has not such extensive function, it remains an alternative expression of notions applicable to physics.

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

> In this description of philosophic method, the term 'philosophic generalization' has meant 'the utilization of specific notions, applying to a restricted group of facts, for the divination of generic notions which apply to all facts.'[11]

Whitehead notes that modern science made a most inconsistent use of philosophical method. It has tended to be rationalistic within its own borders, dogmatically irrational without its boundaries, denying that there are any factors not fully expressible in its own terms. (2) The second condition for the success of imaginative construction is a fidelity to the rationalistic ideals of "coherence and logical perfection." Regarding "logical perfection," mathematics furnishes an ideal example. In the history of mathematics, general notions and special notions presuppose each other. The spinning of the general mathematical theories on the basis of imaginative impulse has produced fruitful special applications in the development of science.[12] "The requirement of coherence is the great preservative of rationalistic sanity."[13] All systems, scientific, religious, philosophical, do not admit of mere illogicalities, they exhibit "inadequacy and incoherence." A system when new enjoys a "plenary indulgence" for its failures, but after it has been taught, its inadequate selections of certain portions of experience, and its incoherencies are found intolerable, a reaction sets in. Illustrative is Spinoga's positing of a one-substance world to correct Descartes' arbitrary two-substance system.

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

The chief error of philosophy is "overstatement."[14] The aim at generalization is sound, yet the estimate of success attained is usually faulty. Overstatement may take the form of the "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness."[15] This error is that of mistaking the abstract for the concrete, which follows upon a neglect of the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered as exemplifying certain categories of thought. For example, Newtonian physics held a view of a simple location of material configurations in a closed system. Hume saw that the simple location of matter, in a given period of time, carries no reference to other times: a past and a future. Therefore induction cannot be based on anything which can be observed as inherent in nature. Since there is nothing in present fact which inherently refers to either past or future, ". . . the order of nature cannot be justified by the mere observation of nature."[16]

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[12] A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), p. 48.

[13] Process and Reality, p. 8. Hereafter the abbreviation "P.R." will be used when referring to Process and Reality.

[14] Ibid., p. 11.

[15] Science and the Modern World. pp. 75 ff. Hereafter the abbreviation "S.M.W." will be used when referring to Science and the Modern World.

In reference to another form of overstatement, there is the claim of certainty and clarity in logical procedure. In this concern, philosophy has been deceived by the example of mathematics. The goal of discussion in philosophy should lead to an accurate framing of the final generalities, not a deductive process as in mathematics. Whitehead refers to the Introduction of Principia Mathematica in which both he and Russell acknowledge certain "insuperable" difficulties regarding the "ultimate logical principles."

"The verification of a rationalistic scheme is to be sought in its general success, and not in the peculiar certainty, or initial clarity, of its first principles."[17] In this connection, one of the modern habits of thought which the Philosophy of Organism denies is the validity of "Arbitrary deductions in ex absurdo arguments."[18] Whitehead denies the assertion that contradiction, which results from a train of reasoning, is due to the falsity of one of the premises from which the inference is made. In this case philosophy has been misled by the example of mathematics.

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[16] P. R., p. 75.

> But in the absence of a well-defined categoreal scheme of entities, issuing in a satisfactory metaphysical system, every premise in a philosophical argument is under suspicion.[19]

The logician's alternative of true or false, if applied to any scheme treating it as one complex assertion, will bring the verdict, "false." Whitehead claims that the same is true ". . . respecting the existing formulated principles of any science."[20] The scheme is true with certain reservations regarding unforeseen qualifications, exceptions, and limitations. However, the scheme is a matrix from which true principles can be derived which are applicable to experience. Thus the utmost precision should be employed in the formulation of the scheme.

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. viii.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

The consequent observation after the formulation of the scheme may take the form of three conclusions. First, there may be agreement with the observed facts, the result of which is that the facts are more adequately known and the applicability of the system is heightened. Second, there may be agreement in the generalities, disagreement in detail. This requires both a criticism of the observations and of the details in the scheme. "The history of thought shows that false interpretations of observed facts enter into the records of their observation."[21] Thus both theory and fact are in doubt. Third, if the conclusions are in complete disagreement with the facts, then either the theory must be reorganized or abandoned.

> After the initial basis of a rational life, with a civilized language, has been laid, all productive thought has proceeded either by the poetic insight of artists, or by the imaginative elaboration of schemes of thought capable of utilizations as logical premises.[22]

IV. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A SPECULATIVE SCHEME

Professor Whitehead lists five requirements for a speculative scheme which give in outline his own view upon this issue.[23] There is first of all, " . . . conformity to intuitive experience." The meaning of this is not clear. Dorothy Emmet's suggestion seems reliable: "The first should mean that there is something fatally wrong with philosophical ideas if they fail to find a place for what we cannot possibly doubt."[24] She suggests the example of Hume's denial of the continuity of the self, which is something one must assume in order to talk or think, as a violation of the first category. Such claims as that of Hume plainly cannot be held except when philosophizing.

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[21] Ibid., p. 13.

[22] Ibid., p. 14.

Secondly, "Clarity of the propositional content" is a requirement of speculative philosophy. On the whole, both Greek and modern philosophy assume that it is simple to formulate "exactly expressed propositions." The modern stress on induction is evidence of the effort devoted to the discovery of propositions which conform to experience. Whitehead warns however that such a process is not easy. Apart from metaphysics, the understanding of the component elements of a proposition is an exceedingly difficult task. The analysis of experience without introducing interpretative elements, which may be faulty, is also difficult. The judgment of direct conformity to experience is difficult to substantiate without the possibilities of doubt. The self-consistency of a proposition is subject to doubt, for a further analysis may disclose a flaw. This flaw may appear when a proposition is related to other propositions accepted as true. If these two criteria are easily determined, the next three would be unnecessary.

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[23] The Function of Reason., pp. 53 ff. Hereafter the abbreviation "F. R." will be used when referring to The Function of Reason.

[24] D. M. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism (London: Macmillan and Company, Limited, 1932), p. 15.

A third criterion is that of "Internal Logical Consistency." It has already been noted that the ". . . requirement of coherence is the great preservative of rationalistic sanity."[25] This criterion is to serve as a judge to ascertain the relevance of concepts, grasped in moments of insight, by relating them to other ideas. Philosophical systems are not refuted, they are abandoned. "Thus, after criticism, systems do not exhibit mere illogicalities. They suffer from inadequacy and incoherence."[26]

Fourthly, "External Logical Consistency" is an expansion of the third criterion; in this case ". . . we are comparing the propositions under scrutiny with other propositions accepted as true."[27] The relation between criterion three and four is not altogether clear. The third demands coherence among first principles of the scheme, the latter requires coherence among derivative propositions which are applied to experience.

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[25] P. R., p. 9.

[26] *Loc. cit.*

The fifth criterion, "Status of a Logical Scheme," is introduced as a means of testing the validity of the philosophical scheme when no precise method of verification of the first four is available. When the propositions of a system are not all verifiable, those that are substantiate the others, providing all the propositions are coherently oriented within the system. There is a duplication here, and Whitehead does not make these criteria separately distinct. The fifth criterion seems to stress methodology rather than the systematic coherence. The scheme's purpose is to produce a greater understanding of the world, including a more adequate analysis not only of ideas but of "immediate fact." If the system has the characteristic of suggesting methodologies of which it is explanatory, it achieves the character of generating ideas coherent with itself, and thus receives a type of continuous verification.

These five criteria taken together assert that the function of speculative reason is to erect a system of general ideas which is applicable to the whole of experience. This, according to Whitehead, is an "impossible ideal"; yet, on the contrary, philosophical progress has come from holding this ideal as an operative one.

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[27] F. R., p. 54.

V. SCIENCE AND SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

The success of scientific methodology has prejudiced its proponents to the view that the philosophical basis of science is clear and certain. This dogmatic attitude, evidenced by many scientists, was acquired from mathematics and theology. This mode of thinking in the sciences has lead to the bifurcation of experience into "moral science," and "natural science," whereby Newton and his many followers claimed that science can proceed without regard for metaphysics. Newton's boast, hypotheses non fingo, was invalidated at the outset for, in proclaiming his law of gravitation, he generalized only from observed planets and heavenly bodies. "Newton was weaving hypotheses;"[28] Newton's formula was not false, it was unguardedly stated. Likewise Einstein's formulae are not false, but "unguardedly stated." We do not yet know the limitations of the latter's formulae.

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[28] Ibid., p. 42.

> In scientific investigations the question, True or False?, is usually irrelevant. The important question is, In what circumstances is this formula true, and in what circumstances is it false? If the circumstances of truth be infrequent or trivial or unknown, we can say, with sufficient accuracy for daily use, that the formula is false.[29]

In this way Whitehead feels that dogmatic finality vanishes and the approach to the truth is made in an "asymptotic" fashion.

It is Whitehead's contention that when scientific procedure is pressed to determine, without ambiguity, its own method, it is involved in the metaphysical formulations of speculative reason. Thus the talk of science being purely a description of things observed is a myth. Some scientific philosophers claim that mere observations are particular occurrences and these occurrences are in no need of metaphysics.

> This doctrine is beautifully clear; and in the sense in which the doctrine is clear, natural science can be of no importance. We can only urge the importance of science by destroying the clarity of the doctrine.[30]

Such science assumes neither induction, causation, nor an objective world, and is limited to occurrences in the lives of certain men of science. "A treatise on a scientific subject is merely an alternative way of editing a 'Scientific Who's Who' with most of the proper names left out . . . Unfortunately most of the observer's names are omitted in these treatises--so all interest has evaporated."[31] Thus if science is the quest for simplicity of description, apart from metaphysics, science has lost its importance.

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[29] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

Such adherents of science then try to preserve the importance of science by introducing "inductive generalization," by which future observations are brought into the scope of scientific statements. Also, the notion of observable is introduced as something which is not observed. Then a speculative description of spatial-temporal occurrence is posited which forms the basis upon which "observability" is predicated. Finally, prediction is claimed for the observability of occurrences which are generically different from any heretofore made. This fallacious procedure is illustrated at length by Whitehead.[32] Observations suggest a theory of electromagnetic equations. Radio apparatus and techniques for transmitting and receiving broadcasts are worked out as a result of the theory. Eventually a broadcast is made from the laboratory and people within a certain radius hear the music. "Is it credible to believe that the only principle involved is the mere description of the original particular observations?"[33] What has happened is that the formulae are descriptive of some characteristics of the common external world, which are relevant to the transmission of "physical states" from the activities of a radio performer to the bodies of the listeners. This position is a long way from the "sweet simplicity" of the original doctrine of science as a mere description of observations. The notion of the external world is introduced with its spatial-temporal occurrences speculatively described by science. By the substitution of "observable" for "observed," the notion of "potentiality" has been introduced.

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[31] Ibid., pp. 44f.

[32] Ibid., p. 45.

> But the claim of science that it can produce an understanding of its procedures within the limits of its own categories, or that those categories themselves are understandable without reference to their status within the wider categories under exploration by the speculative Reason--that claim is entirely unfounded. Insofar as philosophers have failed, scientists do not know what they are talking about when they pursue their own methods; and insofar as philosophers have succeeded, to that extent scientists can attain an understanding of science.

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[33] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

> With the success of philosophy, blind habits of scientific thought are transformed into analytic explanation.[34]

Further, the notion of "fact" apart from "interpretation" is pure prejudice. The uselessness of philosophical speculation is an objection which received its major force since the time of Francis Bacon. One is told that human reason should attempt to describe matters of fact and then elicit laws whose generality is limited to the described details. The difficulty arises when one attempts to express the matter of immediate experience; its understanding " . . leads us beyond itself, to its contemporaries, to its past, to its future, and to the universals in terms of which its definiteness is exhibited."[35] Thus an understanding of a "fact" requires its metaphysical interpretation as an item in a world which has a systematic relation to it. Philosophy does not initiate interpretations, rather thought itself initiates them as matters of practice. Our experience is a complex of failure and success in the art of interpretation.

> If we desire a record of uninterpreted experience, we must ask a stone to record its autobiography. Every scientific memoir in its record of the 'facts' is shot through and through with interpretation.[36]

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[34] Ibid., pp. 47f.

[35] P. R., p. 21.

[36] P. R., p. 22.

The function of philosophy is to correct itself by consciousness of its own subjectivity; its task is to recover the totality obscured by the selection of aspects of the totality by individuals who did so for their own limited purposes. This selectivity of individual experience is a moral issue. In so far as the abstraction is balanced in importance by conjoining it to "generality of outlook," "morality of outlook" is achieved.

Another charge against speculative philosophy is that scientific first principles are fixed and that those of philosophy are always in a state of development and flux. The history of science illustrates the importance of the criticism of speculative philosophy. In the early days, the two were hardly distinguishable. In later developments, most sciences have accepted the general notions in terms of which they develop and stress adjustment and direct verification of "special statements." In these latter periods, scientists repudiate philosophy, Newton being the example Whitehead gives. The fate of Newtonian physics is a warning that there is a development in scientific first principles. Their original forms need limitations and reinterpretations in order to be applicable. "Thus one aim of philosophy is to challenge the half-truths constituting the scientific first principles."[37] A systematization cannot be achieved in "water-tight compartments." That scientists will object, Whitehead is certain, and he recognizes the reasons for this.

> Your thorough-going scholar resents the airy speculation which connects his own patch of knowledge with that of his neighbor. He finds his fundamental concepts interpreted, twisted, modified. He has ceased to be king of his own castle, by reason of speculations of uncomfortable generality, violating the very grammar of his thoughts.[38]

Nevertheless, great discoveries are the result of flights of imagination, rash venture into the unknown which clash with conventional knowledge. The general truths of one field condition those of others, and the limitation of such a truth cannot be defined apart from its correlation with wider generalities. Thus philosophy is to determine the proper meanings of the fundamental notions of the sciences when " . . . these notions are considered in respect to their status relatively to each other."[39] In order to determine such a status, a generality is needed which must transcend any special subject matter.

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[37] P. R., p. 15.

[38] A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), pp. 137-138.

[39] P. R., p. 15.

A further word needs to be said about the relation between philosophy and science. Because Whitehead came to philosophy from the mathematical sciences, this does not mean that mathematical procedure is enshrined as the normative methodology for all knowledge. He uses mathematical terms extensively and examples from mathematics are amply employed, but a charge of blind legislation of one method for all experience is not justified. On the contrary, Whitehead writes,

> ". . . the method of philosophy has also been vitiated by the example of mathematics. The primary method of mathematics is deduction; the primary method of philosophy is descriptive generalization. Under the influence of mathematics, deduction has been foisted onto philosophy as its standard method, instead of taking its true place as an essential auxiliary mode of verification whereby to test the scope of generalities.[40]

VI. RELIGION, SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, AND SCIENCE

Not only is Whitehead concerned with the relation of science and speculative philosophy, but he discusses the relation of religion to both of them; thus he does not posit a bifurcation of experience into spheres of knowledge and emotion, whereby science is labeled the former, and religion the latter. The danger for speculative philosophy is that it may fail to keep in touch with both religion and science. The importance of philosophy lies in its attempt to fuse the two into one rational scheme.

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[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 15 f.

Religion's task is to translate general ideas into particular thought, emotions, and purposes, which attempt results in a widening of individual horizons beyond "self-defeating particularity." Religion seeks to connect philosophical generalities to the emotions and purposes which arise out of a particular social setting. "Religion is an ultimate craving to infuse into the insistent particularity of emotion that non-temporal generality which primarily belongs to conceptual thought alone."[41] In the "higher" organism a reconciliation is needed in which " . . . emotional experiences illustrate a conceptual justification, and conceptual experiences find an emotional illustration."[42] Philosophy finds religion and modifies it, and religious data form part of the content which a philosophical scheme must encompass.

The motive power in the advance of European science has been an intellectual demand for a rationalization of brute experience. In one sense, the scientific interest is a variant of the religious interest. However, the difference between the two lies in the phases of experience with which they are concerned.

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[41] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[42] *Loc. cit.*

> Religion is centered upon the harmony of rational thought with the sensitive reaction to the percepta from which experience originates. Science is concerned with the harmony of rational thought with the percepta themselves. When science deals with emotions, the emotions in question are percepta and not immediate passions--other people's emotion and not our own; at least our own in recollection, and not in immediacy. Religion deals with the formation of the experiencing subject; whereas science deals with the objects, which are the data forming the primary phase in this experience. The subject originates from, and amid, given conditions; science conciliates thought with this primary matter of fact; and religion conciliates the thought involved in the process with the sensitive reaction involved in that same process. The process is nothing else than the experiencing subject itself. In this explanation it is presumed that an experiencing subject is one occasion of sensitive reaction to an actual world. Science finds religious experiences among its percepta; and religion finds scientific concepts among the conceptual experience to be fused with particular sensitive reactions.[43]

VII. LANGUAGE AND SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

An understanding of the nature and function of language is crucial for metaphysics. Philosophy redesigns language as physical science redesigns pre-existing appliances. Thus at this point the appeal to "facts" is a difficult operation. Mankind does express its general agreement about experience of facts in language, "But the language of literature breaks down precisely at the task of expressing in explicit form the larger generalities--the very generalities which metaphysics seeks to express."[44] Every proposition refers to a universe exhibiting "some general systematic metaphysical character." Unless this were so, the entities which go to make up the proposition, and the proposition as a whole would have no determinate character. "Nothing has been defined, because every definite entity requires a systematic universe to supply its requisite status."[45] Every proposition, in its complete analysis, proposes the general character of the universe required for the fact. Facts are not self-sustaining, "floating in nonentity."

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[43] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

One of the important aims of metaphysics is the analysis of propositions, not only those of metaphysics itself, but ordinary everyday ones. Further, the particular genus of fact which comprises science demands some

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[44] Ibid., p. 16.

[45] Ibid., p. 17.

> . . . common metaphysical presupposition respecting the universe. It is merely credulous to accept verbal phrases as adequate statements of propositions. The distinction between verbal phrases and complete propositions is one of the reasons why the logician's rigid alternative, 'true or false,' is so largely irrelevant for the pursuit of knowledge.[46]

Throughout the history of philosophy, there has been the common assumption that language enunciates well-defined propositions. Language is actually indeterminate because every occurrence presupposes some "systematic type of environment."

The technical language of philosophy is an attempt to attain an adequate expression of the facts of experience in general terms. The clash of metaphysicians and their schools is not a reason for criticism but rather a happy situation for thereby the discussion supplies an approximation to fully expressed propositions. "A precise language must await a completed metaphysical knowledge."[47]

In framing a metaphysical system, one cannot hope for anything but approximation to the general truths sought. There are no axiomatic certainties to begin with; verbal expressions are the starting point, yet they are, in themselves, ill-defined and ambiguous. These verbal expressions are endeavors to state general principles which will be "exemplified" in the description of matters of fact. But the exemplification of the principles in matters of fact is the way by which the words and phrases of principles themselves become clear. "The position of metaphysics in the development of culture cannot be understood without remembering that no verbal statement is the adequate expression of a proposition."[48]

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[46] Ibid., p. 17.

[47] Ibid., p. 18.

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[48] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

CHAPTER II

ORGANISMIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

I. BASIC CATEGORIES OF EXPLANATION

Modern philosophy suffers from an attempted fusion of Cartesian subjectivism and substance metaphysics. This statement needs Whitehead's historical analysis to give a clear picture of its meaning and significance. Beginning with the Greeks, he shows their wisdom of having based any generalization on primary elements in actual experience. Also their principle, that all knowledge is grounded on perception, was indeed sound. When the Greeks analyzed perception, they found it to have a universal quality qualifying a particular substance. "Thus perception is the catching of a universal quality in the act of qualifying a particular substance."[1] The next step was to inquire how the perceiver perceives, and they answered, "By his organs of sensation." Thus the universal qualities which qualified perceived substances were the perceiver's private sensations referred to particular substances other than himself. Thus it may be concluded of the Greek tradition that two of its cardinal postulates were an objective metaphysics and a subject-predicate form of proposition which was held to be adequate for the expression of metaphysical truth.

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[1] P. R., p. 240.

Descartes modified traditional philosophy in two distinct ways. (1) He increased the emphasis upon the substance-quality mode of thought. Actual things required "'nothing but themselves in order to exist'" and were to be thought of in terms of their qualities, some being essential attributes, others accidental modes. (2) He also posited what Whitehead terms "the subjectivist principle." "This is the famous subjectivist bias which entered into modern philosophy through Descartes."[2] This discovery, Whitehead believes, was the greatest philosophical one since the age of Plato and Aristotle. The importance can be illustrated by the proposition, "This stone is grey,"

> For his doctrine directly traversed the notion that the proposition, 'This stone is grey,' expresses a primary form of known fact from which metaphysics can start its generalizations. If we are to go back to the subjective enjoyment of experience, the type of primary starting point is 'my perception of this stone as grey.'[3]

Descartes, however, missed the importance of his discovery, according to Whitehead, for he continued to construe the functions of this subjective enjoyment of experience in the light of substance-quality categories. He did not seem to realize that if the enjoyment of experience is the "constitutive subjective fact," these categories have no validity for metaphysics.

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[2] *Ibid.*, p. 241.

[3] *Loc. cit.*

Hume saw this problem clearly. In considering "'my perception of this stone as grey'" in search of a universal, to explain perceptive enjoyment, "greyness" was the only available candidate. Thus a sensation, "greyness" in this case, was the starting point for his philosophy. But it is at this point that he was deceived by substance-quality thinking. He took the notion of mind to be a substance to which the quality of sensation adhered. "From the original fact, 'my perception of this stone as grey,' Hume extracts 'Awareness of sensation of greyness'; and puts it forward as the ultimate datum in this element of experience."[4]

At this juncture a discussion of the heart of Whitehead's treatment of subjective experience is in order. The subjectivity of experience is formally expressed in the subjectivist principle:

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 242.

> The subjectivist principle is, that the datum in the act of experience can be adequately analysed purely in terms of universals.[5]

Just what is meant is not immediately certain but fortunately Whitehead later amplifies the statement as follows:

> The subjectivist principle follows from three premises: (i) The acceptance of the 'substance-quality' concept as expressing the ultimate ontological principle. (ii) The acceptance of Aristotle's definition of a primary substance, as always a subject and never a predicate. (iii) The assumption that the experient subject is a primary substance. The first premise states that the final metaphysical fact is always to be expressed as a quality inhering in a substance. The second premise divides qualities and primary substances into two mutually exclusive classes. The two premises together are the foundation of the traditional distinction between universals and particulars. The philosophy of organism denies the premises on which this distinction is founded. It admits two ultimate classes of entities, mutually exclusive. One class consists of 'actual entities,' which in the philosophical tradition are mis-described as 'particulars'; and the other class consists of forms of definiteness, here named 'eternal objects,' which in comparison with actual entities are mis-described as 'universals.'[6]

In his denial of these premises, Whitehead rejects the Cartesian formulation of subjective experience. If Whitehead had adopted the substance-quality mode of thinking, it would have been impossible for him to express the real essence of anything because if an entity is defined in terms of its universals or qualities, what has been stated are those aspects in which an entity is like others, not what it is in itself. The abstract and not the real essence has been expressed.

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[5] *Ibid.*, p. 239.

[6] *Loc. cit.*

> There is nothing self-contradictory in the thought of many actual entities with the same abstract essence; but there can only be one actual entity with the same real essence. For the real essence indicates 'where' the entity is, that is to say, its status in the real world; the abstract essence omits the particularity of the status.[7]

Hume, accepting the subjectivist principle, was carried to the sensationalist point of view whose principle is:

> . . . . the primary activity in the act of experience is the bare subjective entertainment of the datum, devoid of any subjective form of reception. This is the doctrine of mere sensation.[8]

When the sensationalist principle and the substance-quality categories are combined into one interpretative scheme, causation is inexplicable. Thus Hume, accepting sensations as the only data of consciousness, could not explain causation, the relation between the sensations themselves, and the relation between the sensations and the objects which they are supposed to represent.

Whitehead's position accepts the discovery of Descartes that the subject experiencing is " . . . the primary metaphysical situation which is presented to metaphysics for analysis."[9] He rejects Descartes' use of this discovery, however. Thus Whitehead asserts the "reformed subjectivist principle."[10] To illustrate the meaning of the principle, the proposition, "This stone is grey," will be of use. This notion is accepted as a datum of the experience in question. However, it is a derivative abstraction which is necessary as an element in the "experiential feeling" but it is illusory if taken as a metaphysical point of departure. Technically the proposition is " . . . the 'objective datum' of a certain physical feeling, belonging to a derivative type in a late phase of a concrescence."[11] In summary, it can be said that Whitehead's reformed principle is simply the Cartesian subjectivism with the substance-quality categories omitted.

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[7] Ibid., p. 94.

[8] Ibid., p. 239.

What then is Whitehead's substitute for "substance"? Remembering that the Cartesian subjectivist principle rests on the substance-quality mode of thinking, one wonders on what basis the reformed subjectivist principle rests. The answer is clear. Presupposed by the reformed principle of subjectivity is the Category of the Ultimate.[12] "This Category of the Ultimate replaces Aristotle's category of 'primary substance.'"[13] Not only is the Category of the Ultimate presupposed by the "reformed subjective principle" but this Category is ". . . presupposed in all the more special categories (this includes principles as well)."[14]

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. 243.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 243 f.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 243.

Three notions are involved in the meaning of this category: "creativity," "many," and "one." "One" stands for the singularity of an entity. The term "many" carries the notion of "disjunctive diversity."

> 'Creativity' is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact. It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively . . . . 'Creativity' is the principle of novelty. An actual occasion is a novel entity diverse from any entity in the 'many' which it unifies. . . . The ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance from disjunction to conjunction, creating a novel entity other than the entities given in disjunction.[15]

In addition to the reformed subjectivist principle, Whitehead employs the "ontological principle" which, like all categories and principles, presupposes the Category of the Ultimate. This principle is one of the four notions which Whitehead singles out for the reason that it is a radical departure from traditional philosophical thought.[16] The principle is formally defined as the eighteenth category of explanation:

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[12] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[13] *Loc. cit.*

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 31 f.

> That every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance, has its reason *either* in the character of some actual entity in the *actual* world of that concrescence, *or* in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence. . . . It [the ontological principle] could also be termed the 'principle of efficient, and final, causation.' This ontological principle means that actual entities are the only *reasons*; so that to search for a *reason* is to search for one or more actual entities. It follows that any condition to be satisfied by one actual entity in its process expresses a fact either about the 'real internal constitutions' of some other actual entities, or about the 'subjective aim' conditioning that process.[17]

To illustrate this principle, Whitehead takes John Locke's notion of "power." The idea of power, Locke claims, forms a large part of our notion of substance. Whitehead transforms the idea of substance into that of actual entities and the notion of power into the ontological principle which asserts that the reason for things is to be found in the "composite nature of actual entities." Thus the search for a reason is always a quest for an actual fact which is the "vehicle of reason."

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[16] *Ibid*., p. 27.

[17] *Ibid*., pp. 36. f.

In addition to the reformed subjective principle and the ontological principle there is a third very important one: the principle of relativity. It is defined in the fourth category of explanation as follows:

> That the potentiality for being an element in a real concrescence of many entities into one actuality, is the one general metaphysical character attaching to all entities, actual and non-actual; and that every item in its universe is involved in each concrescence. In other words, it belongs to the nature of a 'being' that it is a potential for every 'becoming.' This is the 'principle of relativity.'[18]

The word, "relativity," is difficult to delimit; the term has an extended meaning beyond the usual signification. As is often the case, the clearest definition of Whitehead's terms comes in relating them to the concept of substance. Aristotle's substance is " . . . neither asserted of a subject nor present in a subject."[19] Actual entities (Aristotles' particulars) are present in other actual entities. "In fact if we allow for degrees of relevance, and for negligible relevance, we must say that every actual entity is present in every other actual entity."[20]

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[18] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 79.

[20] *Loc. cit.*

This "objectification" of every actual entity is conversely stated in the assertion that every item of the universe is a constituent in the constitution of any actual entity. "This principle of relativity is the axiom by which the ontological principle is rescued from issuing in an extreme monism."[21] Thus another notion is attached to the notion of "relativity," namely, that of "relevance." Following the above quotation, Whitehead elaborates the necessity for a criterion to differentiate actual entities from each other and finds this requisite supplied by the "Principle of intensive relevance."

> The principle asserts that any item of the universe, however preposterous as an abstract thought, or however remote as an actual entity, has its own gradation of relevance, as prehended, in the constitution of any one actual entity: it might have had more relevance; and it might have had less relevance, including the zero of relevance involved in the negative prehension; but in fact it has just *that* relevance whereby it finds its status in the constitution of *that* actual entity.[22]

In his cosmology Whitehead uses relativity in the sense of graded relevancy of all actual entities to each other.

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[21] *Ibid.*, p. 224.

[22] *Loc. cit.*

II. "THE CATEGORIES OF EXISTENCE"

Having seen certain necessary first principles, a discussion of the kinds of existence is now in order. These types, eight in number, are discussed in the second major division of Whitehead's categorical scheme, "The Categories of Existence"; two of these stand out with a ". . . certain extreme finality."[23] The two major categories are those of "actual entities" and "eternal objects" which are best understood when it is realized that they are substituted, respectively, for "particulars" and "universals." These two latter terms Whitehead regards as modes of thinking, having the effect of a Nessus shirt, which destroy the metaphysician who makes use of them.

Apart from the experience of real entities (misnamed particulars) there is nothing, nothing but nothingness. It has already been noted that Whitehead rejects the notion of particulars and seeks a new term to express the reformed idea.

> 'Actual entities'--also termed 'actual occasions'--are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real. They differ among themselves: God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space. But, though there are gradations of importance, and diversities of function,

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[23] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

> yet in the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level. The final facts are, all alike, actual entities, and these actual entities are drops of experience, complex and interdependent.[24]

Each actual entity is capable of being analyzed in a number of different ways. These analyses are relative, in that they are made with varying approximations of concreteness. The analysis of actual entities which exhibits the most concrete elements in an actual entity is termed "prehensive." This prehensive mode of analysis is called the "'division'" of the entity under consideration. The number of divisions is indefinite. "in fact, any characteristic of an actual entity is reproduced in a prehension."[25] A prehension refers to an external world, and further it involves emotion, purpose, valuation, and causation. There can be a real togetherness of actual entities because these entities involve each other by reason of their prehensions of one another. The particular fact of "togetherness" among these entities is referred to as a " . . . 'nexus' (plural form is written, 'nexus')."[26] These three terms, actual entities, prehensions, and nexus, form the ultimate facts of immediate actual experience; all else is "derivative abstraction." The Philosophy of Organism is concerned with " . . . becoming, the being, and the relatedness of 'actual entities.'"[27] The Philosophy of Organism places the idea of relatedness dominately over that of "quality" and finds the basis of the notion of relatedness in relatedness of actualities.

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[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 27 f.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 28 f.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

The second basic category of existence is that of "eternal objects." To begin the definition of "eternal objects," it is well to note that Whitehead uses several terms synonymously with it. Thus category five is stated as follows: "Eternal Objects, or Pure Potentials for the Specific Determination of Fact, or Forms of Definiteness."[28] Eternal objects or potentials are forms available to all actual entities in the universe.

> " . . . an eternal object can be described only in terms of its potentiality for 'ingression' into the becoming of actual entities; and that its analysis only discloses other eternal objects. It is a pure potential. The term 'ingression' refers to the particular mode in which the potentiality of an eternal object is realized in a particular actual entity, contributing to the definiteness of that actual entity.[29]

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[27] Ibid., p. viii.

[28] Ibid., p. 32.

[29] Ibid., p. 34.

III. THE CATEGORIES OF VALUE

Whitehead considers form as one of the factors making for value. Since form is integral to the constitution of existence, existence implies value. "'Value' is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event."[30] Events are centers of value; without value nothing would exist.

The value structure is indicated by nine categoreal obligations.[31] Two categories are sufficient to indicate the general orientation of facts and values. The category of "Subjective Unity" claims that the varied feelings which belong to an incomplete phase in the process of concrescence of an actual entity are compatible for unification because of the unity of the subject. The goal of "unity" guides the self-creative entity; "unity" is a synonym for "value." Derived from it is the notion of "satisfaction."

> The components in the concrescence are thus 'values' contributory to the 'satisfaction.' . . . The process of concrescence terminates with the attainment of a fully determinate 'satisfaction'; and the creativity thereby passes over into the 'given' primary phase for the concrescence of other actual entities . . . . Completion is the perishing of immediacy: "It never really is."[32]

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[30] S. M. W., p. 136.

[31] P. R., pp. 39 ff.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 130.

Other value notions, such as that of "harmony" in the higher phases of experience, are elaborations of this primary concept of "unity" in an actual entity as a "value."

In addition to the basic value notion of unity, there is also "novelty," which every phase of the creative act involves;

> . . . the attainment of a peculiar definiteness is the final cause which animates a particular process; and its attainment halts its process, so that by transcendence it passes into its objective immortality as a new objective condition added to the riches of definiteness attainable, the 'real potentiality' of the universe.[33]

These two notions of "unity" and "novelty" are central to the nature of an actual entity whose existence depends upon value; without value there would be no concrescence of an actual entity; and if not actual entity, no existence. The use of the nine categorical obligations is a speculative attempt to suggest the structure of value in which fact is set.

IV. THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF FEELING

Whitehead's theory of knowledge is not just another attempt to construct a world out of sense data. The so-called clearness of sense data has little bearing on the temporal order of knowing. "It must be remembered that clearness in consciousness is no evidence for primitivness in the genetic process; the opposite is more nearly true."[34] The most primitive element in experience is emotion. This sense of feeling is used synonymously as "prehension." Thus the Philosophy of Organism is a "critique of pure feeling." This use of feeling is not limited to the higher conscious phases of experience but it is seen as the fundamental and primitive theory about experience; it is blind emotion which is received "as felt elsewhere" in another occasion. Feeling is a general term for any type of acting or being acted upon in which the subject is affected.

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[33] *Ibid.*, p. 340.

Professor Whitehead is fully aware that this use of the word, "feeling," in a non-conscious sense may be confusing to the reader.

> We are so used to considering the high abstraction, 'the stone as green,' that we have difficulty in eliciting into consciousness the notion of 'green' as the qualifying character of an emotion. Yet, the aesthetic feelings, whereby there is pictorial art, are nothing else than products of the contrasts which are made possible by their patterned relevance to each other. The separation of the emotional experience from the presentational intuition is a high abstraction of thought.[35]

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[34] Ibid., pp. 263 f.

[35] Ibid., pp. 246 f.

Already it has been noted that an actual entity is the construction of a process of concrescence. Its constituent parts are prehensions or feelings. These feelings are nothing apart from an organic whole, yet they constitute the "receptive" phase in the past world of each entity as received and as felt. The future of an entity consists in the integration of its own causal feelings of the past with each other and with "'conceptual feelings.'"

Whitehead describes a feeling as follows:

> A feeling--i.e. a positive prehension--is essentially a transition effecting a concrescence. Its complex constitution is analysable into five factors which express what that transition consists of, and effects. The factors are: (i) the 'subject' which feels, (ii) the 'initial data' which are to be felt, (iii) the 'elimination' in virtue of negative prehensions, (iv) the 'objective datum' which is felt, (v) the 'subjective form' which is how that subject feels that objective datum.[36]

A feeling is fully determinate; these five factors of its constitution are each determinate. The "'subject'" which feels is the actual entity; it is the end at which the feelings aim, the final cause. "This final cause is an inherent element in the feeling, constituting the unity of that feeling."[37] Whitehead claims the word "subject" to be misleading, though he retains it in the Philosophy of Organism. "The term 'superject'," he says, "would be better."[38]

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[36] Ibid., pp. 337 f.

[37] Ibid., p. 339.

> The subject-superject is the purpose of the process originating the feelings. The feelings are inseparable from the end at which they aim; and this end is the feeler. The feelings aim at the feeler, as their final cause.[39]

Thus whenever the word "subject" is used it carries the notion of a "superject," a dynamic final cause, rather than a static subject in the usual sense of the term. The "initial data" are from the actual world in its character of a possibility for the process of being felt. The relation of the subject to an initial datum is the primary phase of the process of concrescence. The relevance of the entity to other actual entities of its own status " . . . is the initial datum in the process of its concrescence."[40] The "'elimination'" in virtue of negative prehension is important to Whitehead's thought. He asserts that there are no "entity facts" in isolation from all other facts. Thus each item of existence is related to all other items. However, Whitehead intends to part company with a monistic form of a theory of reality. Any entity, though it is related to systematic environment, has its own unique individuality, which cannot be provided for in a monistic system. This status of contextualistic individuality is provided for through negative and positive prehension.

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[38] *Loc. cit.*

[39] *Loc. cit.*

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 230.

The twelfth category of explanation is that

> . . . there are two species of prehensions: (a) 'positive prehensions' which are termed 'feelings,' and (b) 'negative prehensions' which are said to 'eliminate from feeling.' . . . A negative prehension holds its datum as inoperative in the progressive concrescence of prehensions constituting the unity of the subject.[41]

The "objective datum" follows upon the awareness of initial datum and a subsequent elimination of other potentialities from the concrescent process. In the discussion of the reformed subjectivist principle, the proposition, "'this stone is grey!" was used as datum for the experience in question. It is now necessary to state the technical definition as illustrative of the present discussion. "It is in fact, the 'objective datum' of a certain physical feeling, belonging to a derivative type in a late phase of a concrescence."[42]

When a subject feels an object, it feels it in a definite way. Thus there is the "how" of the feeling which is called the 'subjective form' of the feeling. In saying that the "stone is grey", it is meant that the feeling of the actual entity constituting the object has for its subjective form the eternal object, "greyness." Whitehead summarizes a discussion of feeling as follows:

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[41] Ibid., p. 35.

[42] Ibid., p. 243.

> A feeling is the appropriation of some elements in the universe to be components in the real internal constitution of its subject. The elements are the initial data; they are what the feeling feels. . . . The process of the feeling involves negative prehensions which effect elimination. Thus the initial data are felt under a 'perspective' which is the objective datum of the feeling.[43]

The nature of feeling must be clearly grasped before the study can proceed to a discussion of causation and the modes of perception. Thus the following exposition is a more complete statement of Whitehead's explanation of the initial and objective datum: a 'simple physical feeling' (f) entertained by one subject (S) is a feeling for which the "initial datum" is another single actual entity (A), and the objective datum is another feeling (g) entertained by the latter actual entity (A). In a simple physical feeling (f), there are two actual entities concerned. One of them is the subject of that feeling (S), and the other is the initial datum of the feeling (A). A second feeling (g) is also concerned, namely, the objective datum of the simple physical feeling (f). This second feeling is the "objectification" of its subject (A) for the subject (S) of the simple physical feeling (f). The initial datum (A) is objectified as being the subject of the feeling which is the objective datum: the objectification is the "perspective" of the initial datum from the standpoint of S.[44]

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[43] Ibid., p. 353.

A simple physical feeling is an act of causation. The actual entity which is the initial datum is the "'cause.'" The physical feeling is the effect, and the subject of the feeling is the actual entity conditioned by the effect. Whitehead also calls the conditioned actual entity, an effect.

A simple physical feeling is the most primitive type of an act of perception, which act is devoid of consciousness. The actual entity, which is the initial datum, is the actual entity perceived; the objective datum is the "'perspective'" under which that actual entity is perceived and the subject of the simple physical feeling is the perceiver.

Concerning the notion of a flow of feeling from cause to effect, Whitehead remarks that a simple physical feeling feels another feeling. This other feeling has however a different subject (A) from the subject which feels it (S).

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[44] *Ibid.*, p. 361.

The way in which the subject (S) feels the simple physical feeling (f) is the subjective form of f. This subjective form of f is re-enacted in the subject (S) of the feeling felt by A. Thus the cause passes on its feeling to be reproduced by a new subject as its own, yet the feeling is inseparable from the cause, the initial datum (A).

The "re-enaction" is not perfect due to the limitations demanded by the process of concrescence. Nevertheless, the " . . . cause is objectively in the constitution of the effect, in virtue of being the feeler of the feeling reproduced in the effect with partial equivalence of subjective form."[45] These two functions of primary feelings, the causal and the perceptive, evidence the machinery by which creativity transcends the actual in the advance to novelty.

All feelings are not simple. The illustration of the nature and function of feeling was made in order that the basis of Whitehead's complex theory might be grasped clearly; feelings are not to be thought of as "simples." Initial data of a complex feeling are many--the objective datum of a complex feeling is always a nexus; "Thus a nexus is a realized pattern of the initial data . . ."[46] The multiplicity of initial data, after it is partially eliminated by the function of negative prehensions, effects a nexus, a novel unity of novel unified entities.

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[45] *Ibid.*, p. 363.

No limitation as to the number of types of feeling is possible. The determination of these types is a process fashioned by the complexity of initial data and of the objective datum which is finally felt. This concept of range in types of feeling requires a discussion of "novelty." The data do not determine the nature of the feeling itself.

> The feeling is always novel in reference to its data; since its subjective form, though it must always have reproductive reference to the data, is not wholly determined by them.[47]

As this thesis is not primarily concerned with an exposition of Whitehead's theory of feeling, only the three primary types of feeling which enter into the formation of all the complex feelings will be considered.

> These types are: (i) that of simple physical feelings (which has already been discussed), (ii) that of conceptual feelings, and (iii) that of transmuted feelings. In a simple physical feeling, the initial datum is a single actual entity, in a conceptual feeling, the objective datum is an eternal object, in a transmuted feeling, the objective datum is a nexus of actual entities. Simple physical feelings and transmuted feelings make up the class of physical feelings.[48]

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[46] Ibid., p. 352.

[47] Ibid., p. 355.

[48] Loc. cit.

Conceptual feelings are the prehensions of eternal objects. The "greyness" of a stone is indicative of a conceptual feeling of an eternal object, "greyness." A conceptual feeling is one which prehends an eternal object that has the "capacity" for being realized in the concrescent process of an actual entity.

> Immanence and transcendence are the characteristics of an object: as a realized determinant it is immanent; as a capacity for determination it is transcendent; in both roles it is relevant to something not itself. There is no character belonging to the actual apart from its exclusive determination by selected eternal objects.[49]

A conceptual feeling has the capacity of exclusiveness whereby an actual entity receives determination. In a conceptual feeling there is no progress from the "initial data" to "objective datum." Positive conceptual prehensions determine the potentiality which is to be actualized in the entity in question. Negative prehensions are those which feel the eternal objects that are to remain merely potential. "Conceptual prehensions, positive or negative, constitute the primary operations among those belonging to the mental pole of an actual entity."[50]

The distinction between conceptual and physical feeling is basic to the thought of Whitehead. An actual entity is always dipolar: its physical pole is its feeling of other actual entities, its mental pole is the feeling of an eternal object which is termed conceptual feeling. Since every actual entity has a mental pole (in the vast majority of actual entities, this mental pole is negligible), the conceptual feeling must not be confused with the small class of intellectual feelings called "conscious." The physical pole is the passive aspect of actual entities for it is that aspect which is being acted upon by other actual entities. The mental pole is the active side whereby a process of feeling out possibilities is undergone.

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[49] Ibid., pp. 366. f.

[50] Ibid., p. 367.

An actual entity must enter into the concrescence of a subject by some simple causal feeling; no matter how remote it may be, it is prehended positively. There is no such necessity in the case of the eternal object. In any concrescence, it may be included positively by means of a conceptual feeling, but it may be excluded by a negative prehension. "The actualities have to be felt, while the pure potentials can be dismissed."[51]

The subjective form of a conceptual feeling has the character of a "valuation." By this is meant, that an eternal object is considered more or less suitable for ingression into the concrescence of the actual entity. The selection of such an eternal object depends upon its compatibility with the subjective aim of the actual entity. This notion refers to the Category of Subjective Unity which states that:

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[51] Ibid., p. 366.

> The many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase in the process of an actual entity, though unintegrated by reason of the incompleteness of the phases, are compatible for integration by reason of the unity of their subject.[52]

Valuation, that is the status and kind of eternal object which by ingression enters into the concrescence of the actual entity, is the outcome of the subjective aim of the subject which determines what it is to be as a result of the character of the "subject-superject."

The third basic type of feeling, which enters into the formation of all the more complex kinds of feeling, is that of the transmuted type. Transmuted feelings make up the other member of the class of physical feelings. A transmuted feeling emerges from the integration of a conceptual feeling, derived from a number of physical feelings, with those physical feelings themselves. In that transmuted feeling, the group of entities is felt as a whole exemplifying the eternal object of the conceptual feeling. If a subject (S) prehends a red book, a nexus constituted by actual entities A, B, and C, S will have a number of physical feelings, all with the subjective form, redness. Each physical feeling, that of A, B, or C, gives rise to a derivitive conceptual feeling, redness. In this case, the same conceptual feeling is derived equally from the several physical feelings. The subject (S) may then have a transmuted feeling in which the nexus, composed of entities A, B, and C, is qualified by the eternal object, redness.

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[52] Ibid., p. 39.

V. UNCONSCIOUS PERCEPTION

If two divisions of experience are possible in Whitehead's system, they would be between unconscious and conscious experience. Whitehead claims:

> Mental activity is one of the modes of feeling belonging to all actual entities in some degree, but only amounting to conscious intellectuality in some actual entities.[53]

Unconscious activity is the basis of conscious mental activity; the latter is a late derivation from complex integrations. Since this dissertation is concerned with the late phase of experience, it will prove advisable to begin with unconscious experience and proceed to that of consciousness.

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[53] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

There are three modes of perception; all three are unconscious. They are perception in the mode of causal efficacy, in the mode of presentational immediacy, and in the mode of symbolic reference. The first two modes are incapable of error, the latter accounts for it.

The mode of causal efficacy deals with prehensions or feelings. Perception in this mode is an emotional feeling of the feelings belonging to actual entities. In the traditional pattern these characteristics of actual entities would be described as universals and qualities modifying substance. Here they are termed subjective forms of the feelings of actual entities. The importance of this notion of causal efficacy is summarized as follows:

> If his theory of perception in the mode of causal efficacy be right, Whitehead has at one stroke solved three of the most perplexing problems of philosophy. In the first place causation [illegible] no longer a mystery for a simple act of perception in this mode is an act of causation . . . . In the second place the objects of perception are directly perceived for they are present as objectified in the perceiving object. All difficulties of a representative theory are thereby avoided. And in the third place it is particular existants that are perceived and not merely universals or qualities.[54]

In a sense the discussion of perception in the mode of causal efficacy will be an elaboration of what has already been said in connection with the treatment of the subjectivist principle and the nature of feeling. Whitehead notes that both Hume and Descartes acknowledge that sense perception is accompanied by an awareness of a "withness" of the body. In order to escape the consequences of Humian sensationalism, which is carried to its logical completion in Santayana's "solipsism of the present moment," the organic theory of experience includes something more in direct perception than presentational immediacy. This "something more" is a feeling of the body as functioning;

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[54] J. W. Blyth, Whitehead's Theory of Knowledge (Brown University Studies, Vol. VII, Providence, R. I.: Brown University, 1941), p. 22.

> This is a feeling of the world in the past; it is the inheritance of the world as a complex of feeling; namely, it is the feeling of derived feelings. The later, sophisticated perception is 'feeling the contemporary world'.[55]

The awareness of the past world is the causal basis upon which sense observation depends for its contemporary subject matter. It has already been noted in the discussion of feeling (Section V) that primitive feeling is both an act of perception and one of causation. One of the most incisive treatments of the nature of causal efficacy is as follows:

> The former mode [causal efficacy] produces percepta which are vague, not to be controlled, heavy with emotion: it produces the sense of derivation from an immediate past, and of a passage to an immediate future;

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[55] P. R., p. 125.

> a sense of emotional feeling, belonging to oneself in the past, passing into oneself in the present, and passing from oneself in the present towards oneself in the future; a sense of influx of influence from other vaguer presences in the past, localized and yet evading local definition, such influence modifying, enhancing, inhibiting, diverting, the stream of feeling which we are receiving, unifying, enjoying, and transmitting. This is our general sense of existence, as one item among others, in a efficacious actual world.[56]

Thus in the discussion of feeling, the mechanics of perception in the mode of causal efficacy were actually being treated. The description of perception in the mode of causal efficacy can thus be completed by a reorganized illustration taken from Whitehead's writings: actual occasions A, B, and C enter into the experience of occasion M. A, B, and C have themselves experienced eternal objects x and y, which objects or sensa are unified in some patterns as they are felt in occasion M. The direct perception of A, B, and C is the causal efficacy of A, B, and C as elements in the constitution of M.[57]

In order to conclude the treatment of perception in the mode of causal efficacy and serve at the same time to introduce perception in the mode of "presentational immediacy," the following excerpt will be helpful.

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[56] *Ibid.*, p. 271.

[57] *Ibid.*, pp. 176 f.

> The bonds of causal efficacy arise from without us. They disclose the character of the world from which we issue, an inescapable condition round which we shape ourselves. The bonds of presentational immediacy arise from within us, and are subject to intensifications and inhibitions and diversions according as we accept their challenge or reject it. The sense-data are not properly to be termed 'mere impressions'--except so far as any technical term will do. They also represent the conditions arising out of the active perceptive functioning as conditioned by our own natures. But our natures must conform to the causal efficacy. Thus the causal efficacy *from* the past is at least one factor giving our presentational immediacy *in* the present. The *how* of our present experience must conform to the *what* of the past in us.[58]

The perceptive mode of presentational immediacy corresponds roughly to what is usually termed "sense perception." Thus it becomes necessary to distinguish the traditional view from that of the Philosophy of Organism. The reason that Whitehead redesigns the traditional notion of sense perception is that it proves deceptive, deceiving the inquirer by its obviousness. Whitehead is led to this conviction through a process of inquiry in which he constantly reminds himself " . . . that the doctrines which best repay critical examination are those which for the longest period have remained unquestioned."[59]

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[58] A. N. Whitehead, *Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), p. 58. Hereafter the abbreviation "S." will be used when referring to *Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect*.

> Presentational immediacy is our immediate perception of the contemporary external world, appearing as an element constitutive of our own experience. In this appearance the world discloses itself to be a community of actual things, which are actual in the same sense as we are.[60]

Presentational immediacy begins with the sense presentation of the contemporary body. It gives positive information only about the immediate present as defined by itself. Thus prehensions in this mode are those which are most vivid. The vivid obviousness of these prehensions has thrust a topsy-turvy methodology upon philosophical inquiry; it has led philosophers to make emotional and purposeful experience derivative and dependent upon what Hume termed impressions of sensation; actually the opposite is the case.

> The percepta in the mode of presentational immediacy have the converse characteristics [from those of causal efficacy]. In comparison, they are distinct, definite, controllable, apt for immediate enjoyment, and with the minimum of reference to past, or to future. We are subject to our percepta in the mode of efficacy, we adjust our percepta in the mode of immediacy.[61]

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[59] A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), p. 228. Hereafter the abbreviation "A. I." will be used when referring to Adventures of Ideas.

[60] S., p. 21.

[61] P. R., p. 271.

It has been noted, in the discussion of feeling, that the cause is objectified in the effect. This objectification is the content of the perceptive mode of presentational immediacy. Objectification is the process whereby the initial datum (A) becomes part of S while still existing outside of S.

> I maintain that presentational immediacy is that peculiar way in which contemporary things are 'objectively' in our experience, and that among the abstract entities which constitute factors in the mode of introduction are those abstractions usually called sense-data:--for example, colours, sounds, tastes, touches, and bodily feelings.
>
> Thus 'objectification' itself is abstraction; since no actual thing is 'objectified' in its 'formal' completeness. Abstraction expresses nature's mode of interaction and is not merely mental.[62]

The notion of abstraction is outstanding and deserves more attention. Objectification, as was noted above, is an abstraction because its potentialities have been drastically curtailed, for purposes of ingression, into an actual occasion. Thus, "Abstraction expresses nature's mode of interaction and is not merely mental."[63] Here is another instance of Whitehead taking a traditional notion of epistemology and spinning a speculative scheme to ground these notions cosmologically. When awareness of sense objects is termed an abstraction, one realizes that the word "abstraction" is no mere label but has ontological status in the process of creativity.

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[62] S., p. 25.

[63] *Loc. cit.*

This mode of presentational immediacy is the mode by which we gain consciousness of the extensive relations of the world. "In this 'mode' the contemporary world is consciously prehended as a continuum of extensive relations."[64] It is not the purpose of this thesis to set forth Whitehead's theory of the extensive continuum. This continuum is merely a potential scheme of realities which is actualized by each set of relations constituting on actual entity. This notion of the continuum, in which all relations are internal, is constructed to meet difficulties in the traditional notions of space and time and those bequeathed by Zeno.[65]

The pure mode of presentational immediacy gives no information about the past or future. The pure mode of causal efficacy concerns the past. To deal with problems of relating the present to the past and future, Whitehead employs the mixed mode of symbolic reference noting that the ". . . failure to lay due emphasis on symbolic reference is one of the reasons for metaphysical difficulties;

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[64] P. R., p. 95.

[65] A short but excellent treatment of this notion of the extensive continuum is that of Blyth, op. cit., Ch. V. VI.

it has reduced the notion of 'meaning' to a mystery."[66]

Symbolic reference demands a common ground; it requires components of experience which are identical in both the two pure modes. Symbolic reference belongs to the higher originative phases of experience, and it is in this free creative phase that error is possible. The possibility of error is a ". . . . mark of the higher organisms . . . ."[67] In human experience, "perception" almost always means perception in this mixed mode of symbolic reference.

There are two elements of the common ground shared by the primary modes. The first element is the "presented locus." This locus is only vaguely functional in the mode of causal efficacy. It is indirectly gleaned as participating in a general scheme of present extensive interconnection. This is true because contemporary events are neither "causing nor caused by" the percipient actual occasion. But there is a direct perception of the antecedent actual occasions having a causally efficacious function both for the percipient and the relevant events in the presented locus. Thus the percipient has an indirect perception of this locus, a perception in which the direct components belong to the pure mode of causal efficacy.

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[66] P. R., p. 255.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 256.

In the case of the locus of presentational immediacy, the regions perceived by direct and indirect knowledge are inverted. The presented locus is directly illustrated by the sensa; the causal past and future along with other contemporary events are only indirectly perceived through their relation to the presented locus. All scientific measurements and observations are in presentational immediacy. Scientific theory is in terms of relatedness, and in so far as relatedness is observed it is involved in the percepta of the mode of causal efficacy.

"The second 'ground' for symbolic reference is the connection between the two modes effected by the identity of an eternal object ingredient in both of them."[68] The first ground stresses the identity of an extensive region with a diversity of eternal objects; the second admits a diversity of extensive regions with an identity of an eternal object. In this latter ground, for example, there is an identity of the eternal object in the visual sense and in the region of stone perceived in the mode of presentational immediacy. What is thus given (visual sense), is given by reason of the objectification of actual entities in the past (those of the nexus of the stone).

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[68] Ibid., p. 259.

An illustration of the grey stone will serve to interpret perception in the mixed mode of symbolic reference. For the percipient (S) there are colored "sensa" (grey) and geometrical relationships (those of the stone). Also, there is in the datum " . . . the geometrical relationships forming the completion of this potential scheme into the contemporary world, and into the future."[69] The responsive phase of the percipient absorbs these data as material for the new occasions of an unity of feeling. Thus there results the "percepta" of the region illustrated by the sense data, grey. The term "stone" is applied to an historic route in the past which is efficacious in the present occasion.

> It is only properly applied to the contemporary region illustrated by 'grey' on the assumption that this contemporary region is the prolongation, of that historic route, into the presented locus. This assumption may, or may not, be true . . . . What is directly perceived, certainly and without shadow of doubt, is a grey region of the presented locus. Any further interpretation, instinctive or by intellectual judgment, must be put down to symbolic reference.[70]

It is important, however, to note that in complex human experience this symbolic reference operates two ways. Primarily, it is the elucidation of "percepta" in the mode of causal efficacy (the historic route of the feelings entertained from the stone which are causally efficacious) by the appearance of "percepta" in the mode of presentational immediacy (greyness), forming the mixed mode perception of a grey stone. It must be noted that the grey stone illustration is not to be taken as affirming symbolic reference of only conscious existence. Symbolic reference is also "blind," by which is meant that it is a process in which consciousness is not necessarily involved.

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[69] Ibid., pp. 260 f.

[70] Ibid., p. 261.

Thus far only the unconscious structure of Whitehead's organismic reality has been described. This unconscious universe finds itself an emergent unity with but amplifications of the original processive structure of the simple feelings. There is complexity and multiplicity in the more elaborate feelings of the universe, yet this latter world of feeling is but an enlargement of the basic pattern of the smaller. Out of the microcosmic process of becoming, an actual entity emerges; out of the macrocosmic process, the transition from one entity to another and observed changes in the actual world are accounted for.

VI. PROPOSITIONS AND PROPOSITIONAL FEELINGS

The nature of propositions is of immediate concern. The conceptual prehension of a living occasion can be either pure or impure. A pure prehension is one whose datum is an eternal object; ". . . the datum of an impure prehension is a proposition otherwise termed a 'theory.'"[71] An impure prehension arises from the integration of a pure prehension with a physical prehension. By this Whitehead seems to mean that the prehension of greyness, an eternal object, is pure, whereas the integration of greyness with the physical prehension of a nexus of actual entities comprising the stone may produce a proposition or theory. This is a logical extension of the notion of symbolic reference to describe the tools used to deal with the datum in this mixed mode of perception when complex mentalistic operations are involved.

Those operations which issue in impure prehensions are termed "'propositional prehensions.'" A propositional feeling is a prehension whose objective datum is a proposition. The exact status of propositions in the philosophy of Whitehead is difficult to determine. One thing is certain; he is directly opposed to the traditional notion of a proposition as having its primary function that of an element in judgment.

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[71] *Ibid.*, p. 280.

> Unfortunately theories, under their name of 'propositions,' have been handed over to logicians, who have countenanced the doctrine that their one function is to be judged as to their truth or falsehood. . . . The doctrine here laid down is that, in the realization of propositions, 'judgment' is very rare component, and so is 'consciousness.'[72]

The source provided by imaginative literature, he claims, should have warned the logicians that their narrow doctrine, that propositions are only material for judgments, is impossible. In the case of the Christian meditating upon the Gospels, he is according to Whitehead, not judging "true or false," he is " . . . eliciting their value as elements in feeling. In fact he may ground his judgment of truth upon his realization of value."[73] This would be impossible if the primary function of propositions is to be elements in judgments.

The nature of a proposition can be described by referring to Whitehead's illustration of the battle of Waterloo. There are a number of possibilities, other than the defeat of Napoleon, which could have resulted from the battle. Though these alternatives may not be of practical importance, their relevance is admitted by thinking of them, even though they may then be dismissed.

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[72] *Ibid.*, p. 281.

[73] *Loc.* *cit.*

> Thus, in our actual world of today, there is a penumbra of eternal objects, constituted by relevance to the Battle of Waterloo. . . . The elements of this penumbra are propositional prehensions.
>
> Thus an element in this penumbral complex is what is termed a 'proposition.' A proposition is a new kind of entity. It is a hybrid between pure potentials and actualities.[74]

The most concise definition of a proposition is as follows:

> A proposition is the abstract possibility of some specified nexus of actualities realizing some eternal object, which may either be simple, or may be a complex pattern of simpler objects.[75]

It is very important to note that propositions are not necessarily apprehended consciously. The reason that propositions are often considered to be apprehended consciously is due to "overintellectualized philosophers" who have been interested primarily in logic. By being so engaged, these philosophers have obscured the main function of propositions. "They [propositions] are not primarily for belief, but for feeling at the physical level of unconsciousness."[76]

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[74] Ibid., p. 282.

[75] A. I., p. 312.

[76] P. R., pp. 283 f.

"A proposition enters into experience as the entity forming the datum of a complex feeling derived from the integration of a physical feeling with a conceptual feeling."[77] A proposition is not a possibility for actuality in the same sense as an eternal object. A conceptual feeling refers to an eternal object which is potential for actualization; it does not refer to the actual world; ". . . eternal objects tell no tales as to their ingressions."[78] Propositions, on the other hand, are " . . . the tales that perhaps might be told about particular actualities."[79] These propositions must be true or false however, and truth and falsity are grounded on reason, and, according to the ontological principle, reason always demands a reference to actual entities. Since an eternal object is not an actual entity, it is neither true nor false. Truth and falsity are only qualities of propositions.

The sets of actual entities involved in a proposition are called the "logical subjects of the proposition"; the sets of eternal objects involved are termed the "predicates of the proposition."[80] "The predicates define a potentiality of relatedness for the subjects."[81] According to the ontological principle, everything must be somewhere and thus Whitehead places the locus of a proposition in those actual occasions whose worlds include the logical subjects of the proposition. And conversely, when the actual entity itself belongs to the proposition's locus, the proposition is " . . . an element in the lure for feeling of that actual entity."[82] If the proposition has been admitted into concrescence, it constitutes " . . . what the feeling has felt."[83] A proposition is a "lure for feeling" by reason of the "germaneness" of its predicate to the local subjects. Relationships between a proposition and the actual world of a member of the proposition's locus are of two kinds, conformal and non-conformal, true and false. In a conformal proposition, the reaction to the data has produced a conformation of feeling to fact in which valuation has been completed. A non-conformal proposition's reaction to the data results in a " . . . synthesis of fact with the alternative potentiality of the complex predicate."[84]

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[77] Ibid., p. 391.

[78] Loc. cit.

[79] Ibid., p. 392.

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[80] Ibid., p. 283.

[81] Loc. cit.

[82] Loc. cit.

[83] Loc. cit.

A further word is necessary about the truth and falsity of propositions. A proposition is the possibility of a certain predicate applying to certain logical subjects in an assigned way. Every proposition is indeterminate, in so far as it concerns its own realization in a propositional feeling, as regards its own truth. The logical subjects are actual entities which presuppose their unity. Thus a proposition is true or false but its truth or falsity is not the function of a proposition. The question of the proposition's truth or falsity belongs to the subject entertaining a propositional feeling which has the proposition as its datum. Truth or falsity is a judgment passed on propositions, but the potentiality for being judged does not exhaust their function. The logicians, with their "moralistic" preference for true propositions, have obscured the function of propositions in the actual world. In the real world " . . . it is more important that a proposition be interesting than that it be true."[85] This broader function of a proposition is found in imaginative literature. Often there are phrases, such as "once upon a time," used to inhibit the formation of judgment feeling. In summary, propositions are either conformal or non-conformal, true or false, yet their function is primarily that of being a "lure for feeling."

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[84] _Ibid._, p. 284.

[85] _Ibid._, pp. 395 f.

The logical subjects of the proposition are now to be considered. The conventional logical term, "particular," carries a similar meaning to what Whitehead terms a "logical subject." Logical subjects are not comparisons with other concepts, " . . . they are particular facts in a potential pattern."[86] But particulars must be indicated because a proposition concerns only those particulars. "'Those particulars as thus indicated in such-and-such a predicative pattern' constitutes the proposition."[87] Thus it becomes necessary to study the theory of indication.

A relation between actual occasions is an eternal object illustrated in the unity of a nexus. A "dual relation" is a case in which two eternal objects are realized in a nexus. Thus there may be an indefinite number of relations between occasions in a nexus. "A 'general principle' is an eternal object which is only illustrated through its 'instances,' which are also eternal objects."[88] The realization of a general instance is also the realization of an eternal object. But the realization of a general principle does not involve the realization of any particular instance, but however does involve the realization of some instance. Instances involve a general principle (universal) yet the principle only involves one instance. Whitehead gives the example of color as a general principle and colors as instances.[89]

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[86] Ibid., p. 295.

[87] Loc. cit.

The following quotation tersely illustrates an indicative system of dual realations, the simple truth of which is applicable to complicated types of relations.

> A nexus exhibits an 'indicative system' of dual relations among its members, when (i) one, and only one, relation of the system relates each pair of its members; and (ii) these relations are instances of a general principle; and (iii) the relation (in the system) between any member A and any other member B does not also relate A and a member of the nexus other than B; and (iv) the relations (in the system) between A and B and between A and C suffice to define the relation (in the system) between B and C, where A, B, and C are any three members of the nexus.[90]

One of the features of this notion of the indicative system of relations is that a particular subject of experience can be eliminated from the truth of a proposition.

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[88] Loc. cit.

[89] Ibid., p. 296.

[90] Loc. cit.

Subjectivism can be eliminated from experience; therefore relations are autonomous. A's knowledge of B, C, and D does not mean that B is dependent upon the system of A's relations to B, C, and D for its propositions concerning C and D.

> Every proposition presupposes some general nexus with an indicative relational system. This nexus includes its locus of judging subjects and also its logical subjects. This presupposition is part of the proposition, and the proposition cannot be entertained by any subject for which the presupposition is not valid.[91]

This presupposition of a character of the environment is a more complex matter than that of a simple spatio-temporal indicative system. The proposition, "Socrates is mortal" may mean "the man Socrates is mortal" or "the philosopher Socrates is mortal." Whitehead illustrates this point at length claiming the proposition, "Caesar has crossed the Rubicon," to be a form of words symbolizing an indefinite number of diverse propositions. The proposition had an historical meaning, but it could have had many historical meanings dependent upon whether its user was a follower of Caesar or not; and it can also have a contemporary meaning given by a modern traveler sitting on the bank of the Rubicon. The futileness of the assumption that a verbal statement is the adequate expression of one proposition is here made evident. It is equally absurd to assert a claim for the meaning of such a sentence.

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[91] *Ibid.*, p. 297.

> A proposition is the potentiality of the objectification of certain presupposed actual entities via certain qualities and relations, the objectification being for some unspecified subject for which the presupposition has meaning in direct experience.[92]

In the second place, a discussion of the process by which a proposition becomes the datum for a propositional feeling is of concern. As previously noted, all forms of consciousness arise from the integration of propositional feelings with other feelings--either with conceptual feelings or with physical feelings. Since the interest here is in propositions and judgments of religiously oriented persons, a description of this process whereby a proposition becomes the datum for a propositional feeling will be given. A propositional feeling emerges in a late phase of the process of concrescence.

In brief, there are four types of feelings which may be involved in propositional feelings: first, physical feeling whose objective data include actual entities as logical subjects, Second, there are physical feelings from which predicative patterns are derived. These feelings thus involve certain eternal objects among ". . . the determinants of the definiteness of its datum . . ."[93] These feelings are also called "physical recognition." Third, conceptual feelings of an eternal object derived from some feeling included in group two. Fourth, conceptual feelings which are reversions from the previous type of conceptual feelings, hence involving different eternal objects. An eternal object which serves as the datum of either type of conceptual feeling is termed the "predicative pattern."

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[92] *Ibid.*, p. 299.

Next is a consideration of feelings of "physical recognition"; those from which predicative patterns (eternal objects) arise.

> From each physical feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual feeling whose datum is the eternal object exemplified in the definiteness of the actual entity, or the nexus, physically felt.[94]

A description of the origination of a propositional feeling is now in order; this description regards a proposition in which greyness is predicated of a stone. A propositional feeling of the datum, "This stone is grey," arises in the late phases of a concrescence of a subject S in which there is an integration of the "indicative feeling" (a feeling of the first type) with a "predicative feeling" (a feeling of either type three or four). In this integration, the indicative feeling of the stone and the conceptual feeling, "grey," are synthesized by a double elimination involving both data. The notion of elimination is described as follows:

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[93] Ibid., p. 397.

[94] Ibid., p. 379.

> The actual entities involved in the datum of the indicative feeling are reduced to a bare multiplicity in which each is a bare 'it' with the elimination of the eternal object really constituting the definiteness of that nexus. But the integration rescues them from this mere multiplicity by placing them in the unity of a proposition with the given predicate pattern.[95]

Propositional feelings may be classified on the basis of the way in which these four types of feeling are involved. Propositional feelings may be divided into "imaginative feelings" and "perceptive feelings." The former are feelings in which the feelings of group one are different from group two. It is this former type of propositional feeling which is involved in the intuitive judgments which will be discussed later (Chap. III, Sect. VII). A "perceptive feeling" is one in which the "indicative feeling" and "physical recognition" are one and the same feeling. This type of feeling is that which is involved in "conscious perceptions." The distinction between these two types of propositional feelings is not as clear-cut as might be assumed. In the case of imaginative feelings, they vary in the degree of approximation to the identity of perceptive feeling. This distinction is further complicated by noting three species of perceptive feelings which Whitehead differentiates. The first is that of "authentic perceptive feelings" which derive their predicative pattern straight from "physical recognition" without any reversion taking place. This feeling has a proposition " . . . whose predicate is in some way realized in the real nexus of its logical subjects."[96] This does not necessarily mean that the proposition is true because it may wrongly implicate the logical subjects. Thus these authentic perceptions are feelings which are "direct." The second species is that of "indirect perceptive feelings" where reversions are involved. Both these two species of feeling are termed authentic. The third is that of "unauthentic feelings"--those which Whitehead terms "tied." In this case, there is only one physical basis, hence there is only one feeling, which is both the "indicative" feeling and the "physical recognition." In this last case, "The imagination is tied to one ultimate fact."[97]

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[95] *Ibid.*, p. 398.

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[96] *Ibid.*, p. 400.

Having discussed perceptive feelings, the second type of propositional feelings to be considered is "imaginative feelings." Imaginative feelings are those which are characterized by a difference of indicative feeling and physical recognition. There are many degrees of difference, varying from extreme diversity to near identity. To the extent that there is diversity there is evidence of free imagination.

> The proposition which is the objective datum of an imaginative feeling has a predicate derived, with or without reversions, from a nexus which in some respects differs from the nexus providing the logical subjects.[98]

A proposition gives no suggestion as to how it should be felt; in one subject it may be a datum of perceptive feeling; in another, it may be datum of imaginative feeling. In summary, a direct, authentic perceptive feeling is true; an imaginative feeling may be true.

VII. THE CONSCIOUS CHARACTER OF COMPARATIVE FEELINGS

Until now, the thesis has dealt with those elements in experience which lie below the level of consciousness.

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[97] *Ibid.*, p. 401.

[98] *Ibid.*, p. 402.

In the following discussion of comparative feelings, the divide will be crossed from unconscious to conscious experience. Since the concern of this dissertation is with the veridical claims of religious judgments, this next section is of heightened importance.

The infinite variety of feelings in the Philosophy of Organism are considered under the general title, "comparative feeling." The data of comparative feelings are generic contrasts. There are two types of comparative feeling; one type rises from the integration of a "propositional feeling" with "indicative feeling" from which it is derived. This integrated type of feeling is called "intellectual feeling." Of these intellectual feelings, there are two subtypes: "conscious perception" and "intuitive judgments." The subjective form of an intuitive judgment also involves consciousness. The other type of comparative feeling is termed "physical purposes." These feelings arise from the integration of conceptual feelings with the simple physical feelings from which they are derived. The subjective form of these feelings does not involve consciousness unless these feelings acquire integration with conscious perceptions or intuitive judgments. It is evident that the concern of this dissertation will be with the "intellectual feelings" because they include both conscious perceptions and intuitive judgments.

> In an intellectual feeling the datum is the generic contrast between a nexus of actual entities and a proposition with its logical subjects members of the nexus.[99]

In the contrast between the actual entities which are the logical subjects of a proposition, and the nexus of the actual entities in which the logical subjects occur, there is thus a "two way functioning" of the entities in each of the contrasted factors, the nexus and the proposition. In the prehending subject, this two way aspect is unified as "contrast."

> This one analysable part ("contrast") involves in itself the contrast between the sheer matter of fact, namely, what the objectified actual entity in question contributes to the objectified nexus in the physical feeling, and the mere potentiality of the same actual entity for playing its assigned part in the predicative pattern of the proposition, in the eventuality of the proposition's realization.[100]

This contrast is what is termed by Whitehead, the "affirmation-negation contrast." The contrast lies between the affirmation of objectified fact in the physical feeling and the mere potentiality which proves to be the negation of such an affirmation. At this point, consciousness is present; "The subjective form of the feeling of this contrast is consciousness."[101]

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[99] *Ibid.*, p. 407.

[100] *Loc. cit.*

Conscious perception arises from the integration of a perceptive feeling with a physical feeling. The origination of perceptive feeling has already been noted. The integration of physical and perceptive feeling with conscious perception confronts the nexus with a potentiality which is derived, limited to, and exemplified in the nexus. Conscious perceptions are subject to error; however, what is doubted is not the immediate perception of a nexus; "The dubitable element is the definition of this nexus by the observed predicate."[102] What is doubted, for example, is the truthfulness of the predicated "grey" of the nexus, "stone."

The second type of intellectual feelings is intuitive judgment. The term "judgment" refers to three species among comparative feelings. These three species are composed of the feelings in the "yes-form," feelings in the "no-form," and those feelings in the "suspense-form."[103]

In all three species of felt contrast, the datum obtains its unity by reason of the "objective identity" of the actual entities on both sides of the contrast. In the second category of the nine Categoreal Obligations, one reads in regard to the notion of "objective identity":

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[101] Loc. cit.

[102] Ibid., p. 412.

[103] Ibid., pp. 412 f.

> There can be no duplication of any element in the objective datum of the 'satisfaction' of an actual entity, so far as concerns the funstion of the element in the 'satisfaction.'[104]

Thus there is unification of this two-way functioning into one role with a "two-way aspect" in order to conform to this above category. In the "yes-form" of feelings, this unity has a further ground by reason of the identity of the pattern of the nexus with the predicate. The "no-form" lacks this extra type of identity and in its place is found "incompatible diversity." The "suspense-form" is neither identical nor incompatible with the pattern; "In this species of comparative feeling there is therefore contrast between pattern and predicate, without incompatibility."[105]

Intuitive judgment and conscious perception, since they are both comparative feelings, result from an integration of the physical feelings of a nexus with a propositional feeling whose logical subjects are the actual entities in the nexus. In the case of intuitive judgment, there is a more complex process of origination. "There are two distinct physical feelings, the indicative feeling and the physical recollection."[106] From physical recollection arises the predicative feeling, and the integration of predicative feeling with indicative feeling produces imaginative feeling. This imaginative feeling is a propositional feeling with the logical subject derived from the indicative feeling and the predicative pattern from physical recollection.

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[104] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

[105] *Ibid.*, p. 413.

The intuition is a comparative feeling with its datum constituted by the contrast between nexus involved in the indicative feeling and the proposition involved in the imaginative feeling; the contrast is between exemplification and potentiality. If there be an identity between pattern and predicate " . . . the proposition coheres with the nexus and this coherence is its truth."[107] If there is a lack of identity between proposition and nexus, "Then the proposition in some sense, important or unimportant, is not felt as true."[108]

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[106] Loc. cit.

[107] Ibid., p. 414.

[108] Loc. cit.

The subjective form of intuitive judgment is incapable of error for it infallibly brings awareness of "what is." Error arises in the task of determining the nature of "what is."

> The condensed analysis of the stages of origination of an intuitive judgment is (i) the 'physical recollection' and the 'indicative feeling,' (ii) the 'predicative feeling,' derived from the physical recollection, (iii) the 'imaginative feeling' derived by integration of the 'predicative feeling' with the 'indicative feeling,' (iv) the intuitive judgment, derived by integration of the 'imaginative feeling' with the indicative feeling.[109]

An important fact about intuitive judgments is that they do not demand either belief or disbelief. Belief arises with the identity of the nexus and the propositional predicate. If the predicate of the proposition is incompatible with a nexus, disbelief results. A third type of judgment is the most usual; "It is the task of the inferential process sometimes to convert a suspended judgment into a belief, or a disbelief, so far as the final satisfaction is concerned."[110]

The most important function of intellectual feelings is " . . . to heighten the emotional intensity accompanying the valuations in the conceptual feelings involved . . ."[111]

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[109] *Ibid.*, p. 415.

[110] *Ibid.*, p. 416.

[111] *Loc. cit.*

These feelings function to limit abstract valuation to the possibilities relevant to definite logical subjects.

It now becomes important to distinguish between intuitive judgment and conscious perception. From what has so far been stated, it is apparent that the two are very analogous.

> A conscious perception is a very simplified type of affirmative intuitive judgment; and a direct affirmative intuitive judgment is a very sophisticated case of conscious perception.[112]

The difference between the two is that the conscious perception involves a perceptive feeling; intuitive judgment involves an imaginative feeling. The difference between them is not in the proposition felt, but in the emotional pattern of the two feelings. The emotional pattern of a perceptive feeling involves a close connection between the predicate and the logical subjects throughout the process of origination. The imaginative feeling has an emotional pattern which evidences an "initial disconnection" of the predicate from the logical subjects. This latter point illustrates that in the process whereby there is an integration of feeling, components actually eliminated from integration leave their mark on the emotional pattern. "The triumph of consciousness comes with the negative intuitive judgment."[113] In summary, only one set of actual entities is involved in the formation of a perceptive feeling, whereas two sets of actual entities are involved in the formation of imaginative feeling.

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[112] *Ibid.*, p. 417.

The discussion now involves the second type of comparative feeling, "physical purposes." Physical purposes are more primitive than intellectual feelings. A physical purpose is a feeling of contrast between a physical feeling and an eternal object. The physical feeling is the experience of feeling a real fact; the conceptual feeling is the valuing of an abstract possibility. The synthetic feeling, integrating both these feelings in one feeling of contrast, is physical purpose. "This synthesis of a pure abstraction with a real fact, as in feeling, is a generic contrast."[114]

The attitude of the subject at the level of physical purpose is that of "valuation." If valuation be favorable, then the term "adversion" is used to indicate that creativity has felt this valuation and " . . . is thereby an element with some force of persistence into the future beyond its own subject."[115] If on the other hand, the valuation be unfavorable, the term "aversion" is used to indicate that creativity inhibits " . . . the elimination of content, and the lapse into triviality."[116] Adversion promotes stability; aversion promotes change, which is not specified as to whether it is toward value or disvalue.

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[113] *Loc. cit.*

[114] *Ibid.*, p. 421.

A word must be said about the mental pole of an actual entity in the process of concrescence. Mental operations are responsible for the subjective aim of the subject, an aim which dominates the goal of the concrescent process in the form of a final cause. Efficient causation in this process is derived from the actual world. Mental operations perform the task of "valuation"; they determine the relative efficiency of feelings, not only to unite in objectifying the subject, but they serve to objectify the subject beyond itself into the future. Thus these mental operations enable the subject to act as an "efficient" as well as a "final" cause. Thus the mental pole is the link whereby the creativity is endowed with the double character of final causation, and efficient causation.[117]

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[115] *Ibid.*, p. 422.

[116] *Ibid.*, p. 423.

[117] *Loc. cit.*

Since the first species of physical purpose has been discussed, a treatment of the second species is in order. This second species is due to the origination of reversions at the mental pole. Whitehead asserts that a more complex form of physical purpose is responsible for the role of rhythm and vibration in the physical world. Reversions are the conceptual feelings which arise by reason of the "lure of contrast." The subjective aim of the process of concrescence is "intensity of feeling." Upon the ingression of an eternal object into the process, feeling results, and when a contrast of eternal objects is evident, this feeling intensity is heightened. The aim of the concrescent process is not only an intensification of feeling in the immediate subject, but in the "relevant future" as well. In regard to the relevant future, Whitehead remarks that the greatest part of morality has to do with the "relevant future."

This urge for intensity of feeling is an urge for the realization of the greatest number of eternal objects, which number can only be felt under the regulation of contrast. "It follows that balanced complexity is the outcome of this final category of subjective aim."[118] By the term "balance" it is meant that no realized eternal object shall eliminate or thwart potential contrasts of other eternal objects.

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[118] Ibid., p. 424.

One element in the subject's immediate feelings comprises "anticipatory feelings" of the future's relation to present fact. "This is the feeling of the objective immortality inherent in the nature of actuality."[119] God, as the principle of concretion, functions in this respect as the principle of limitation (His primordial nature) whereby eternal objects are envisaged and valued in regard to their relevance for ingression into the temporal process.

VIII. THE RELATION OF PROPOSITIONS AND JUDGMENTS

> All metaphysical theories which admit a disjunction between the component elements of individual experience on the one hand and on the other hand the component elements of the external world, must inevitably run into difficulties over the truth and falsehood of propositions, and over the grounds for judgment. The former difficulty is metaphysical, the latter epistemological.[120]

The first difficulty raises the question of truth and falsehood; the second " . . . poses the question as to the account of the intuitive perception of truth and falsehood."[121] The former concerns propositions, the latter judgments. Whitehead opposes any theory of knowledge that denies what he calls, "togetherness in experience."[122] This togetherness is experiential and the Philosophy of Organism denies any meaning to "togetherness" apart from this experiential meaning. If the "togetherness" of subjective experience and the external world is denied, insuperable difficulties are raised.

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[119] *Ibid.*, p. 425.

[120] *Ibid.*, p. 288.

[121] *Loc. cit.*

> For intuitive judgment is concerned with togetherness in experience, and there is no bridge between togetherness in experience, and togetherness of the non-experiential sort.[123]

In the Philosophy of Organism, the theory of judgment may, according to Whitehead, be described either as a coherence or as a correspondence theory. It is a correspondence theory because it describes judgment as " . . . the subjective form of the integral prehension of the conformity, or of the non-conformity, of proposition and an objectified nexus."[124] This judgment is a coherence theory in that it is concerned with a conformity of two components within one experience. It would seem that Whitehead's theory is really a form of correspondence theory, used of course in his own particular way within the Philosophy of Organism, and not a coherence theory at all, at least in the usual sense of the term.

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[122] Loc. cit.

[123] Ibid., p. 289.

[124] Ibid., p. 290.

Shortly after this explanation, Whitehead uses these two theories in a different sense, which usage seems to be his central intention. A proposition, in this latter mode of thinking, can be either true or false, and the theory of the epistemological process involved in determining veridical status is termed a "correspondence theory." A judgment, on the other hand, can be correct, incorrect, or suspended and thus Whitehead speaks of a "coherence theory" in regard to these three forms of judgment.

A judgment is a feeling in the process of the judging subject, " . . . and it is correct or incorrect respecting that subject." A judgment enters into the judging subject as a value. A proposition emerges in the analysis of a judgment; it is the datum of the judgment. A judgment, as noted in the discussion of comparative feelings, is a synthetic feeling which embraces two subordinate feelings in a unity of feeling. One of these subordinate feelings is propositional, the other is that of the nexus of actual entities. "The judgment is a decision of feeling, the proposition is what is felt; but it is only part of the datum felt."[125] A judgment concerns the universe as it is in the process of being felt by the judging subject. For example, I judge the stone to be grey. This judgment concerns a selection of objective actual entities composing the stone and an eternal object, greyness, and a "physical objectification" of the entities with the eternal object so that there is an "objectified nexus" whose actual entities (stone) are interconnected and qualified by the eternal object, greyness. This judgment asserts, correctly or incorrectly, a real fact in one's own constitution, namely, "I am judging the stone to be grey." "The judgment is made about itself by the judging subject, and is feeling in the constitution of the judging subject."[126]

At this point, the two kinds of judgments, intuitive and derivative, will be introduced. Whitehead leads up to this notion by noting that affirmations about logical subjects are different from those about the judging subject. Identification of the two senses leads to error. In an affirmation about a judging subject, there is an abstraction from the judging subject. In this type of affirmation, the judgment has been shifted from the objective nexus to the truth value of the proposition itself.

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[125] *Ibid.*, p. 293.

[126] *Ibid.*, p. 291

Intuitive judgment is concerned with the objectified nexus and there is no abstraction from the judging subject.

> In an intuitive judgment the integration of the physical datum with the proposition elicits into feeling the full complex detail of the proposition in its comparison of identity, or diversity, in regard to the complex detail of the physical datum.[127]

A derivative judgment is an abstraction from the judging subject in that the sole concern is the truth value of the proposition in question.

> In a derivative judgment the integration of the physical datum with the proposition elicits into feeling the full complex detail of the proposition, but does not elicit into feeling the full comparison of this detail with the complex detail of the physical fact.[128]

In the discussion of intuitive judgment, the metaphysical description given it by Whitehead will be reviewed. An intuitive judgment is a comparative feeling whose datum is constituted by a generic contrast between the nexus involved in the indicative feeling and the proposition involved in the imaginative feeling. An indicative feeling is one whose objective datum includes the requisite logical subject. In the formation of an imaginative feeling, two sets of actual entities are involved; one set is related to an indicative feeling, the other is related to physical recognition. One of these sets is eliminated, leaving only one to provide the logical subject of the proposition. Thus a proposition, which is the objective datum of an imaginative feeling, has a predicate derived from a nexus which differs in some respects from the nexus providing the logical subject. Thus a proposition is felt as an imaginative notion about its logical subject.

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[127] *Ibid.*, p. 292.

[128] *Loc. cit.*

Dorothy Emmet states the relation between intuitive and derivative propositions clearly:

> Whitehead says that when we have an integration of the two kinds of feeling in the experiencing subject, we call the subjective form of its experience a judgment. If there is a complete comparison, so that the physical feeling and the conceptual feeling are seen exactly to fit, we have an intuitive judgment. But this is exceedingly rare, since there is hardly ever a conceptual feeling of a nexus of actual entities apart from abstraction and generalisation . . . So the vast majority of judgments are called "derivative." In this case we have only a partial comparison of the two nexus. But when the abstraction and generalisation involved is clearly stated, the judgment may, within those limits, be correct or incorrect.[129]

If there is identity between the potentiality of the pattern and the exemplified character of the nexus, there is an intuitive judgment of the "yes form." If diversity is the result of this comparison, there is an intuitive judgment of the "no form." The most usual form of an intuitive judgment occurs when ". . . the predicate may be exhibited as irrelevant, wholly or partially, to the eternal objects exemplified in the objectified nexus."[130] This form is the "suspended form" which exhibits neither belief nor disbelief.

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[129] Emmet, *op. cit.*, pp. 168 f.

It is the task of the "inferential process" to convert a suspended judgment, intuitive or derivative, into a belief or disbelief ". . . so far as the final satisfaction [of the subject] is concerned."[131] A further word is needed regarding the function of a derivative judgment. A derivative judgment results from abstraction and generalization and is true or false within the limits of the scope of abstraction or generalization. Whitehead uses "derivative" and "inferential" as synonomous terms for the second class of judgments.[132] A derivative judgment is an abstraction from the process of discovery because it selects only one function of a proposition to be dealt with, namely, propositional conformity or non-conformity. Derivative judgments belong to the domain of logic and are those which are employed by philosophical generalization and are utilized in the erection of systems. Whitehead quotes Locke's notion of a judgment as a statement of the organismic view of "inferential judgment":

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[130] P. R., p. 416.

[131] Loc. cit.

[132] Ibid., p. 409.

> "Judgment, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is, as the word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears. And if it so unites or separates them as in reality things are, it is right judgment."[133]

A derivative judgment is relegated by the Philosophy of Organism to the abstractive logical aspect of experience, and intuitive judgment is relegated to the awareness of compatibility or incompatibility of potentiality for exemplification in the actual world.

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[133] Ibid., p. 418.

CHAPTER III

THE AUTHENTICATION OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

I. THE LEVELS OF RELIGION

In discussing the nature of religion, Professor Whitehead compares it with mathematics.[1] In mathematics a simple dogma carries obvious meaning, and its history has no bearing upon its truth. Religion, on the other hand, is without agreement as to valid religious beliefs, and is lacking an accepted criterion for religious truth. One reason for this situation may be suggested--a suggestion to which Whitehead would agree-mathematical concepts are abstract, whereas religious concepts are concerned with a more complex organic meaning. Another difference is that an individual uses arithmetic, but he is religious. Arithmetical problems can be set aside until settled, but in religious areas the problems faced are of a transforming nature and carry an urgency about them. Character is developed according to faith; thus religion is the ". . . . force of belief cleansing the inward parts."[2]

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[1] A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926), p. 13. Hereafter the abbreviation "R. M." will be used when referring to Religion in the Making.

[2] Ibid., p. 15.

> A religion, on its doctrinal side, can thus be defined as a system of general truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended.[3]

Religion is not primarily a social fact; it is the "art and theory" of the internal life of man which has a two-fold dependence: on man, and on what is permanent in "the nature of things." There is no such thing as individual in opposition to social experience, yet in man's quest for self-realization there is what Whitehead terms " . . . the awful ultimate fact, which is the human being, consciously alone with itself, for its own sake. Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness."[4] Institutions, rituals, bibles, moral codes, are all relatively external trappings of religion.

The concern of religion is with the harmony of rational thought, and the sensitive reaction to the "percepta" from which experience originates. Science is concerned with the harmony of rational thought in the percepta themselves. Religion is engaged in the formation of the experiencing subject, whereas science deals with the objects which are the data forming the primary phases in the experience.[5]

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[3] *Loc. cit.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

Whitehead's idea of religion is strongly individualistic. He defines religion as ". . .what the individual does with his own solitariness."[6] Alongside and inseparably coupled with this emphasis, he stresses its supplement, "world loyalty." No inconsistency is present here because the disavowal of involvement in immediate surroundings is undertaken in order to avoid the confusion of immediate detail with universal principles.

Religion exhibits four levels, which are found not only in historical periods but in contemporary life as well. Though these levels are not mutually exclusive, they will be best treated in their historical order. The first level is that of ritual, which is the habitual performance of acts that have no direct bearing on the physical preservation of the actors. Ritual is dominant at earlier stages of religious development. Later, ritual is performed for the sake of the emotion derived. This is the second level of religion. These two stages of religious development point up the fact that religion is primarily a social phenomina. The third level of religion is that of belief. Belief enters into the ritualistic and the emotional stages of religion to satisfy the demands of "incipient rationality." Myths are constructed to explain the purpose of both ritual and emotion. Whitehead grants that this order of development is a generalization which is only helpful in charting the main line of procedure. It is not a principle to be employed without reservation. The state of rationalism, the fourth level, is a product of the travail of souls during the last six thousand years. This phase of religious growth introduces the age of solitariness. Reason becomes the instrument for discriminating judgments. It leads the way in the adjustment of beliefs into a system ". . . internally coherent and coherent with other beliefs. . . .,"[7] and so provides for a clarification of thought and an ordering of conduct toward defensible ethical ends.

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[5] Supra, Ch. I, Sec. VI.

[6] R. M., p. 16.

Rational religion stands between metaphysics and particular principles which apply only to some experiences. The peculiar relevance of religious concepts is discerned in moments of insight enjoyed by a few. Thus it would seem that religion at its highest is a very specialized interest of mankind. Yet, religion claims that its concepts are to be applied to the ordering of all experience. Religion represents a type of metaphysics that can be derived from the " . . . supernormal experience of mankind in its moments of finest insight."[8] This development of rational religion involves a transformation of the pre-existing religious forms: i.e., of ritual, emotion, and belief. The emergence of rationality is conditioned by the general progress of the race. Thus, for example, the concept of mercy could only arise among people who were, in some respects, merciful.

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[7] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

With the introduction of a rational factor into religious ideas, myths were placed in a reorganized setting that made them the account of " . . . verifiable historical circumstances which exemplified the general ideas with adequate perfection."[9] Appeal is now centered in individual "intuition" of an ethical, metaphysical, or logical type. The judgments passed by the innovators of new religious thought upon the older forms of religion were very severe. Quite naturally so for "Religion is the last refuge of human savagery."[10]

Another characteristic of rational religion is the transition from a social to a world consciousness. This change of vision is brought about by a change in the "concept of rightness." A religion which has only "social" consciousness concerns people whom one knows and loves individually. This type of religion has its concept of rightness mixed up with the notion of preservation. One chooses a mode of conduct which will lead some god to protect him and his friends; religion thus becomes a matter of diplomacy. Rightness is not found in a structure of the universe but consists in obedience to a "Divine Imperative." A world religion is disengaged from the demands of the group; the rightness it proclaims is a universal character to the universe. The emphasis shifts from the will of God to the "goodness of God." In a communal religion the will of God is studied so as to preserve the group; in rational religion the goodness of God is studied in order to be like Him. Thus the change in the concept of rightness, from its association with obedience to its association with self-realization, is regarded by Whitehead as one of the important transitions which marks the emergence of rational religion.

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

Perhaps the broadest stage of a communal religion was that of the cult of the Roman Empire in which, under Augustus, a contemporary of Jesus, the widest possible view of the social structure was adopted. Jewish communal religion conceived the "rightness in things" as limited to the interests of the Jewish race. Whitehead oversimplifies the Jewish tradition, but would justify this procedure by claiming he had done so purposefully to point up general principles. For Whitehead, it is general principles that are significant if a workable understanding of religion is to result. The Jewish type of religion is an exhibit of the kind of religious life to which communities are always reverting. "In the modern world it is the religion of emotional statesmen, captains of industry, and social reformers."[11] This type of religion leads to a morbid exaggeration of "national self-consciousness" and lacks the element of "quietism."

Solitariness and universality develop pari passu. They are mutually related because the latter is a disconnection from immediate surroundings; an attempt to find " . . . something permanent and intelligible by which to interpret the confusion of immediate detail."[12] This element is most often found in the reflective books of religion, such as the book of Job. In this way of thinking there is no effort to reform society or express religious emotion; it is rather an effort ". . . to apprehend some general principles." Consideration of the problem of evil and the desire for the wisdom of life are illustrations of the special concerns of rational religious thinking. These concerns mark the apex of religious development.

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[11] Ibid., p. 43.

[12] Ibid., p. 47.

II. KNOWLEDGE ASPECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

> Religion is founded on the concurrence of three allied concepts in one moment of self-consciousness, concepts whose separate relationships to fact and whose mutual relations to each other are only to be settled jointly by some direct intuition into the ultimate character of the universe.
>
> These concepts are:
> 1. That of the value of an individual for itself.
> 2. That of the value of the diverse individuals of the world for each other.
> 3. That of the value of the objective world which is a community derivative from the interrelations of its component individuals, and also necessary for the existence of each of these individuals.[13]

The religious consciousness starts from self-valuation, but it broadens into the notion of the world as a realm of adjusted values, either intensifying or destroying. Intuition into the actual world gives a particular definite content to a "bare notion" of a principle which is used to determine a scale of values. It discloses emotions, purposes, and physical conditions, all as subservient factors in the emergence of value. The solitary spirit must be merged with the objective universe through "world loyalty." In this solitary experience, the human spirit asks: "What in the way of value, is the attainment of life?"[14] The values of life come through a merging of the individual claim with the universe; "Religion is world loyalty." This claim of world loyalty is a formative principle, and, in so far as life is dominated by religious experience, life is conditioned by it. "The principle is not a dogmatic formulation but rather the intuition of immediate occasions as failing or succeeding in reference to the ideal relevant to them."[15]

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[13] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

Religion concentrates upon the three ideas of individual, social, and cosmic value. These three are value presuppositions which fuse in a single moment of awareness. In this moment, the relationship of these three concepts to fact and to one another is determined. Intuition seeks to discover the ultimate character of the universe, and in this quest it gives content to the three principles. Emotions, purposes, physical conditions, all emerge as concomitants along with value, but they are subservient to value.

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[14] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

[15] *Loc. cit.*

This intuition of immediate occasions is ". . . an apprehension of character permanently inherent in the nature of things."[16] Intuition is of an enduring rightness which effects both efficient and final cause, so that the one conforms to harmonious conditions, while the latter contrasts itself to the harmonious ideal. There is, however, not only conformity but non-conformity as well. "The whole intuition of conformity and diversity forms the contrast which that item yields for the religious experience."[17] Intuition sharpens the characteristics of experience.

It is necessary to note the way in which Whitehead limits the function of intuition. Intuition does not include an awareness of a definite person or individual. Hinduism, Confucianism, and Buddhism disclaim an intuition of a personal being substrate to the universe. To this list of three could also be added Taoism. The main stream of Christian theology has adopted the position that there is no direct intuition of an ultimate personal substratum. The Christian tradition holds the belief in a personal God, but the belief is established by logical inference, not by intuition. The idea of God is established in terms of a system of judgments, not by direct intuition of a personal being. This logical inference may be made by all men upon the basis of their individual experience.

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[16] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 61 f.

The place of intuition in the Christian tradition raises many questions. Some will object and say: "Does not Jesus' relationship with the Father presuppose an intuition of a personal being?" Whitehead does not anticipate this objection directly. He does claim that Jesus introduced important qualifications of the Semitic idea of God. In contrast to the Semitic concept of God, which Whitehead claims was that of a "personal individual entity," Jesus associates God with the Kingdom of heaven, to which the explanation is added, "The Kingdom of heaven is within you." The use of the metaphor, "Father," is further evidence of a modification of the transcendent spirit.[18] Whitehead asserts that the implications of this modification were expanded by the author of the Johannine Epistles and Gospel in the notion of "God is love." In the Gospel, the logos doctrine is a clear move toward a modification of the unequivocal unity of the Semitic God. The movement begun by Jesus shows him to be more concerned with structure in terms of character than intuitions of a transcendent deity. The thesis can be maintained that the Jesus of the gospels did not affirm an intuition of a personal being as the form of religious intuition.

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[18] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

Whitehead points out that if one claims religious experience is the direct intuition of a personal being substrate to the universe, there is no widespread basis of agreement. At the very outset of the argument, considerable disagreement is present in the main streams of religious thought. With the evidence divided, the protagonist of this personal form of an intuition may likely resort to emotion, which Whitehead asserts is the modern method of appeal. By dragging in emotion to "supercede" reason, one has only confused the issue; "Then you can prove anything, except to reasonable people."[19] The place of reason in religion is central, for reason is the safeguard of objectivity.

It is not apparent that Whitehead uses intuition in a particular limited sense. If appeal is made to an intuition whose object is a personal being, which is only experienced in exceptional moments, that intuition becomes a function of such moments. Thus whatever can explain such moments of high emotion can then be taken as an explanation of the intuition. Thus a psychological explanation is fatal to evidence which cannot maintain itself amid a great variety of environmental factors.

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[19] Ibid., p. 64.

The issue needs to be further clarified, for Whitehead does not maintain that exceptional circumstances necessarily rule out veridical claims. Intuitions often occur under exceptional circumstances, but when the intuition has occurred it has its own independence of "irrelevancies." Mathematical intuitions, like religious intuition, often require exceptional circumstances for their revelations, but when they occur they are permanent possessions. However, the psychological interpretation does have its sphere of validity. It holds when the claim of objective validity is made for an intuition which is only experienced as a set of " . . . discrete circumstances of definite specific character."[20] An objective intuition may be clearer under such circumstances but it should not be limited to them. "The point . . . is that a rational religion must not confine itself to moments of emotional excitement. It must fine its verification at all temperatures."[21]

To the extent that we consciously determine our actions, this approximation to the "rightness of things" is an ultimate "premise" to which our choice of immediate ends is compared, evaluated, and motivated. The possibility that men can receive either satisfaction or dissatisfaction, regarding particular happenings, rests upon an intuition which is assumed capable of universalizing. "This universalizing of what is discerned in a particular instance is the appeal to a general character inherent in the nature of things."[22] This intuition is not the discernment of a form of words, it is a "type of character."

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[20] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

> It is characteristic of the learned mind to exalt words. Yet mothers can ponder many things in their hearts which their lips cannot express. These many things, which are thus known, constitute the ultimate religious evidence, beyond which there is no appeal.[23]

III. A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF RELIGIOUS INTUITION

Religious intuition is not the only form of intuition. In one passage, Whitehead refers to three types of intuition: ethical, metaphysical, and logical. In another passage, he uses intuition in such a way as to indicate that he extends the word to include mathematical as well as religious intuition.[24] The type of intuition entertained depends upon the interest of the subject.

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[22] Ibid., p. 67.

[23] Loc. cit.

[24] Ibid., p. 65.

The religious judgment of an intuitive rightness in things is never clearly developed by Whitehead; it is always left shrouded in vagueness. The inclusion of the Pythagoream notion of a "'righteousness in the nature of things,'"[25] in Whitehead's treatment of intuition, suggests a clue to what may likely be the source of this concept of an intuition of a rightness in things. The precision and the resultant satisfaction of mathematical inquiry provide a probable basis for this idea. At the same time it must be recognized that even though genetically the notion may have arisen from the study of mathematical science, its value is not limited to that area. Furthermore, there is no trace of a blind intolerant application of one specialized methodology to all experience, and a consequent exclusion of all data not included within the scope of that methodology as useless or meaningless. Whitehead seeks the widest most comprehensive principles, whose source is in a particular area of experience. This method is employed in any quest for knowledge; the quest begins with concepts pertaining to abstract segments of experience and constructs principles which approach generality of scope

Whitehead's idea of a rightness in things brings an aesthetic satisfaction; precision entails subjective satisfaction. This precision is both in the nature of things in the objective universe, and in the process whereby contrasts are synthesized into objectified datum for the experiencing subject. At this juncture, a brief discussion of Whitehead's aesthetics is necessary. A fact in the objective universe is of an aesthetic nature; " . . . an actual fact is a fact of aesthetic experience."[26] Aesthetic order is a synthesis of contrasts; it is an identity and a difference which makes intensity of feeling possible. Some degree of intensity serves as a common denominator in all acts of experience. This is one reason why an act of experience is an aesthetic fact. The union of prehensions, into actual entities by their subject, brings order. Order is not a static repetitive pattern; it is the result of new phases of experience created by new series of contrasts.

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[25] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

> It is order entering upon novelty; so that the massiveness of order does not degenerate into mere repetition; and so that the novelty is always reflected upon a background of system.[27]

For intensity and depth of experience to occur, there must not be a "too stabilized" order: i.e., an order from which effective contrast has been eliminated. Harmony is the combination of the right chaos and the right narrowness. These two produce "massive simplicity" which is the background of an effective order.[28]

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[26] Ibid., p. 115.

[27] P. R., p. 515.

The order needs the effective contrast of novelty. Order without novelty has the effect of "stifling the freshness of living." "It seems as though the last delicacies of feeling require some element of novelty to relieve their massive inheritance from bygone system."[29] Whitehead further comments:

> The art of progress is to preserve order amid change, and to preserve change amid order. Life refuses to be embalmed alive. The more prolonged the halt in some unrelieved system of order, the greater the crash of the dead society.[30]

Not only is there order in the world, but there is disorder as well. Evil is a real factor in the character of things; a factor which functions obstructively and destructively. Despite the positive fact of evil, the reality of which Whitehead does not mitigate, the final underlying order of the world is moral. The nature of evil is self-destructive; thus in its realization in fact there is "concurrent realization" of a purpose toward elimination. "The fact of the instability of evil is the moral order in the world."[31]

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[28] Dorothy Emmet suggests, "Perhaps . . . we may see a supreme illustration of these principles of the depth and intensity of order in the parables of the New Testament." Illustrating this claim she asserts that there is a "'massive simplicity'" to the background of these parables, which simplicity involves the facts of the world envisaged by the Father who loves righteousness and mercy. The depth of concentration is evidenced by the narrowness of the world of Galilee and the "vivid realism" with which the relations of men are seen. (Emmet, op. cit., pp. 267 f.)

[29] P. R., loc. cit.

[30] Loc. cit.

Every form of reality exhibits a type of order; it is a unity. Any actual entity is not an aggregate, but has a unified structure. The types of order are different; they may be that of a forest, a stone, or a man's life. This intuition of a rightness in things is an awareness of order. Without order there would be nothing for the subject to judge. By order Whitehead means aesthetic order which has unity in contrast. Order is often conceived statically; it is thoroughly dynamic for Whitehead. Order is not to be conceived in a semi-mechanical fashion; the form is not a fixed one which is applied to the process like a potter, with a design in mind for a particular buyer, fashions clay. Nor is the pattern "laid up in heaven." Expression, in the case of a poet for example, is not a formal process whereby an image is decided upon in advance of the expression; it is a quest in which the goal is found only by the expression itself. Form is apparent in retrospection.

In consequence of the discussion on aesthetic order, the question arises: Is the intuition employed in religious experience merely a form of aesthetic judgment? Even though the "rightness in things" is an aesthetic notion of cosmic harmony, there is a peculiar aspect of this intuition which is distinctly religious. Despite the evidence that Whitehead's philosophy is based upon aesthetic experience, it is incorrect to equate religious intuition with his notion of asthetic judgment. The distinctive character of the religious intuition is an awareness of the unity of these three concepts, personal, social, and cosmic value, in an occasion of the objective universe. An aesthetic judgment is an awareness of harmony in a presented scene. Religion evaluates that scene in the light of the principle of world loyalty. It employs intuition to fuse principle with fact in the valuation process of the experiencing subject. Whitehead writes, " . . . religion emphasizes the unity of ideal inherent in the universe."[32] An aesthetic judgment emphasizes the fusion of contrasts into harmony in the creative process of the universe. The content of both the aesthetic and religious intuition appears to be the same: the order of the objective universe. The difference is in the religious use of the ideal of world loyalty to which the intuition of order gives content.

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[31] Ibid., p. 95.

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[32] A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), p. 39.

It is also necessary to distinguish between religious and moral intuition. This intuition of immediate occasions, as failing or succeeding in reference to the ideal relevant to them, is a revelation of character " . . . apprehended as we apprehend the characters of our friends."[33] But Whitehead adds that in this case the character is peculiarly cosmic, and as such distinct from the character of our friends. Moral intuitions are concerned with particular occasions; religious intuitions are concerned with ideals which inhere in the cosmos. Whitehead does not imply that the moral occasion has no cosmic status, but suggests that the difference is in the scope of the intuition. Moral experience is the material out of which rational religion emerges, yet the distinctive characteristic of moral experience is particularity. Thus Whitehead writes, "Morality emphasizes the detailed occasion; while religion emphasizes the unity of ideal inherent in the universe."[34]

The question may be rightly raised as to how this intuition is related to the conscious feelings of the "Higher Phases of Experience." A clear association of "intuition," as used in Religion in the Making, with any particular type of comparative feeling, as employed in Process and Reality, will prove unsatisfactory. The reason for this rests in the fact that Whitehead is attempting, in his treatment of comparative feelings, to account for the infinite variety of complex feelings. A general term of intuition will apply to several of these feelings. Conscious perceptions are very closely related to intuitive judgments, in fact the two coincide in some cases.

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[33] R. M., p. 61.

[34] A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), p. 39. Hereafter the abbreviation "M. T." will be used when referring to Modes of Thought.

> A conscious perception is a very simplified type of affirmative intuitive judgment; and a direct affirmative intuitive judgment is a very sophisticated case of conscious perception.[35]

Intuition can be inclusive of conscious perceptions and intuitive judgments but not of derivative judgments. Intuition of a rightness in things is, in the terminology of Process and Reality, an intellectual feeling of the generic contrast between a nexus of actual entities and a proposition. This generic contrast arises from a two-way functioning of entities which are components in each of the contrasted factors. The subject entertaining these contrasts effects a unity whereby these entities cohere in one role with a two-way functioning.

What then is the relation between these intuitive and derivative judgments? The former are insights in which an awareness of order is prehended; the latter operate upon the data of the intuition. This distinction is clearly seen when the two formal definitions are compared.[36] Intuitive judgments are concerned with the "full complex detail" of both the proposition and the nexus; derivative judgments are concerned with the full complex detail of the proposition.

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[35] P. R., p. 417.

Since all judgments are of the "yes", "no", or "suspense" form, then, how is intuition related to these forms? An intuitive judgment may take any of these three forms. An affirmative intuitive judgment includes conscious perception, but the former is more "sophisticated" than the latter. The negative intuitive judgment is a "triumph of consciousness"; in this case there is a conscious feeling of what "might be," but "is not." A suspended judgment is a feeling of contrast between what the logical subjects are and what they may be. Since religion is concerned with the formation of the experiencing subject, most religious intuitive judgments are of this type. Intuitive judgments pertaining to the human self contrast what the subject is with what it may become. Whitehead nowhere describes or illustrates an intuitive judgment of the "suspense-form."

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[36] Supra, Ch. II, Sec. VIII.

In opposition to the theory of religious intuition being a suspense form of intuitive judgment, Whitehead uses "intuition" in ways which suggest direct negative and affirmative intuitive judgments. For example, he claims that some of the New Testament sayings intuitively point out the relations between good and bad men;[37] these sayings suggest the function of both affirmative and negative intuitive judgment. Such insights are not abstract analyses of the goodness and badness of men (a derivative type of judgment), but are as "immediate pictures."

Since Religion in the Making was written before Process and Reality, the following hypothesis seems to fit the evidence. In the earlier book Whitehead's religious views were more fully stated, but were not related to a metaphysical system. Thus, Whitehead uses the term "intuition" for the awareness of contrast, but does not specify the details involved in the structure of the subject matter forming the contrast, nor does he deal with the relation of the data to the experiencing subject. In Process and Reality he constructs a metaphysics which, by definition, is a fusion of the data from all areas of experience, including religion.

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[37] R. M., p. 57.

In this book he is interested in the structural detail of the data, the process of origination of the data, and the reception of the data in the experiencing subject. Whitehead elaborates the simple notion of "intuition" into certain types of intellectual feelings: namely, intuitive judgments of the three forms. The most commanding evidence for this hypothesis rests in the notion of contrast. In Religion in the Making, intuition treats of the rightness in things as "order" which is evidenced in the form of contrasts. In Process and Reality, this relatively simple notion of contrast is expanded into the "two-way functioning" which becomes a ". . . two-way aspect unified as 'contrast.'"[38] This unity or "objective identity" may be obtained in any of the three felt species of contrast which comprise the three forms of judgment: the "yes," "no," and "suspense" type. Intuitive judgments in Process and Reality are an extension of the original notion of "intuition" in Religion in the Making as Whitehead's thought moves toward a more fully developed system.[39]

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[38] P. R., p. 407.

[39] This hypothesis is not invalidated by the fact that the simple notion of intuition is used in Whitehead's later books, Adventures of Ideas and Modes of Thought. In these works intuition is to mean "awareness"; the epistemological detail is unnecessary to his purpose.

IV. TRUTH CRITERIA FOR RELIGIOUS INSIGHT

Professor Whitehead does not regard religious intuitions as infallible. It is undeniable that an individual is aware of "what is," but claims as to the nature of "what is" are subject to error. However, the experience of fact and the interpretation of fact are not ultimately separable. Whitehead distinguishes between the two in the knowing process, and this distinction accounts for the possibility of error. The vividness of religious experience is " . . . a very poor guarantee for its correct interpretation."[40] When intuition is broken down into its constituents, the subjective form of the intuitive judgment is infallible--there is a feeling of "what is." The content of the judgment is subject to error, due to the possibility of reversion in the "indicative feeling."[41]

Whitehead insists that the truth criteria for religious intuition can never rest upon historical investigation. This is true because a person can only interpret the past in terms of the present; "Thus history presupposes a metaphysic."[42] This criticism of historical investigation applies equally to science and religion, whether the past is that of one second or two thousand years. Neither science nor religion can justify itself without an appeal to metaphysics. Science is more fortunate in respect to its metaphysics than is religion, according to Whitehead, for it can leave its metaphysics "implicit" and proceed pragmatically. "If religion does that, it admits that its dogmas are merely pleasing ideas for the purpose of stimulating its emotions."[43]

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[40] R. M., p. 83.

[41] P. R., p. 414.

[42] R. M., p. 84.

What tests does Whitehead propose for the veracity of religious intuition? Actually, the criteria are the same for religious experience as for sense experience enjoyed in the physical sciences. The tests are those of speculative philosophy--the internal consistency and external comprehensiveness of a metaphysical scheme. "Speculative philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted."[44] In this definition, two aspects of inquiry are stressed: the speculative and the practical, the theoretic and the empiric. Each aspect continually modifies the other. Thus theology is a constant process of revising the theory to fit the data of religious experience, and the meaning of experience is found in terms of the theory."

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[43] Ibid., p. 85.

[44] P. R., p. 4.

> The foundations of dogma must be laid in a rational metaphysics which criticises meanings, and endeavours to express the most general concepts adequate for the all-inclusive universe.[45]

The speculative method begins with the materials of one select field of interest. The truths exemplified in these special instances are then amplified, revised, and applied to the interpretation of life.

> They stand or fall--like other truths--by their success in this interpretation. The peculiar character of religious truth is that it explicitly deals with values. It brings into our consciousness that permanent side of the universe which we can care for. It thereby provides a meaning, in terms of value, for our own existence, a meaning which flows from the nature of things.[46]

When these truths derived from particular interests achieve a generality of reference and receive a "precise enunciation" which is ". . . divested as far as possible from particular exemplification . . . ,"[47] these truths are termed "dogmas." Whitehead uses the word "dogma" in its etymological sense, meaning, "'a philosophical opinion.'"[48]

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[45] R. M., p. 83.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 124.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

In a description of religious insight, the framing of dogma requires the use of ideas that have a distinct "signification." Ideas are not determinate in a vacuum; ideas are determinate only as they are part of a system. "A dogma is the expression of a fact as it appears within a certain sphere of thought."[49] To estimate the validity of a dogma, the dogma must be projected against its alternatives within the system. Finality is impossible for any dogma without claiming equal finality for the sphere of thought within which it arose.

The adequacy of a dogma is in its adjustment of abstract concepts: i.e., certain particular judgments about highly selective portions of experience. The status of these concepts always remains subject to revision. A dogma may be true as an expression of interrelations between concepts of the subject matter within the set of ideas employed.

> But if the same dogma be used intolerantly so as to check the employment of other modes of analyzing the subject matter, then, for all its truth, it will be doing the work of a falsehood.
>
> Progress in truth--truth of science and truth of religion--is mainly a progress in the framing of concepts, in discarding artificial abstractions or partial meta-

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[49] Loc. cit.

phors, and in evolving notions which strike more deeply into the root of reality.[50]

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[50] Ibid., p. 131.

CHAPTER IV

LINGUISTIC SYMBOLIZATION OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

I. ORGANISMIC THEORY OF EXPRESSION

Professor Whitehead employs the same method in formulating his theory of expression as he uses in the construction of speculative philosophy--that of probing behind the obvious perception of common sense experience in search for the structure which makes experience possible. Whitehead asserts that no conscious determination is necessarily involved in expression; there is only an "impulse to diffuse." "Wherever there is a region of nature which is itself the primary field of the expressions issuing from each of its parts, that region is alive."[1] This impulse to diffuse is organic to both vegetable and animal nature. "It is the most fundamental evidence of our presupposition of the world without."[2] No clear line demarcates human nature and the world of which it is a part, and which it prehends in experience. "In fact, the world beyond is so intimately entwined in our natures that unconsciously we identify our more vivid perspectives of it with outselves."[3] Whitehead

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[1] M. T., p. 31.

[2] [illegible]

[3] Loc. cit.

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[1] M. T., p. 31.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

[3] *Loc. cit.*

In mankind, ". . . nature seems to have burst through another of its boundaries."[6] The major factor in human mentality is the entertainment of unrealized potentiality. At the human level of life, the central activity develops the relationship to novelty; novelty is received from the aggregate diversity of bodily functions and from the entertainment of unexpressed possibilities. This latter reception of novelty enlarges the conceptual experience of man. This entertainment of novelty is the heart of the moral life because it compares the content of "what is" with "what may be." Consideration of alternatives is, in its highest development, the "entertainment of the Ideal."

> It emphasizes the sense of Importance . . . And this sense exhibits itself in various species, such as, the sense of morality, the mystic sense of religion, the sense of that delicacy of adjustment which is beauty,

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[4] Ibid., p. 30.

[5] Ibid., p. 30.

[6] Ibid., p. 36.

> the sense of necessity for mutual connection which is understanding, and the sense of discrimination of each factor which is consciousness.[7]

Language is the outstanding example of the way in which man has "fabricated" his manageable connections with the world into a means of expression. "Language is the triumph of human ingenuity, surpassing even the intricacies of modern technology."[8] Of the two alternatives for expression, sight and sound, sound was the first developed. Conceding that there might have been a language of "gesticulation," Whitehead holds that it is too restrictive upon the person employing it; he can do nothing else while gesticulating. Sound, on the other hand, permits freedom for bodily movements not connected with the production of sound. Another more important reason, is that arms and hands constitute the unnecessary parts of the body and thus they are not suitable for expression of "the intimacies of bodily existence."

> Whereas in the production of sound, the lungs and throat are brought into play. So that in speech, while a superficial, manageable expression is diffused, yet the sense of the vague intimacies of organic existence is also excited. Thus voice-produced sound is a natural

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[7] Ibid., p. 37.

[8] Ibid., p. 44.

symbol for the deep experiences or organic existence.[9]

Language has two functions: that of communication with others and with oneself. Whitehead claims language to be an expression from one's past to one's present. Past sensa are reproduced in the present--sensa which have on "intimate association" with the structures of the past. The past is rendered distinctly in the present. "In this way, an articulated memory is the gift of language, considered as an expression from oneself in the past to oneself in the present."[10] In the use of common language:

> . . . the fragmentary past experiences of the auditor, as enshrined in words, can be recombined into a novel imaginative experience by the reception of the coherent sentences of the speaker. Thus in both functions of language the immediate imaginative experience is enormously increased, and is stamped with a sense of realization, or of possible realization.[11]

The content of language, by which Whitehead means the experience it symbolizes, points away from the abstractions of "high grade sensa." The meaning of language presupposes concrete relations of real events. If, to use Whitehead's illustration, a scene is described in which an angry man knocks a neighbor down, each auditor frames a pictorial image of such a scene. But the myriad of these imagined sensa are not the essence of the auditor's thought. "Yet amid all this ambiguity of sensa, the stubborn flux of events is asserted, that the fist of the angry man completely upset the stable functioning of his victim's body."[12] These various sensory patterns in themselves are merely aggregates, but this variety has a unity. The unity is due to the ". . . type of connected process in the world that they suggest."[13]

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[9] Ibid., p. 45.

[10] Ibid., p. 46.

[11] Loc. cit.

Different sensory experiences derived from the same action have a unity in the identity of the action. The accounts of the action may be in different languages and utilize different visual or auditory sensa, yet they do refer to the same action. Language utilizes the most easily abstracted elements of experience and by long usage these elements are associated with the meaning of the language.

> Each language embalms an historic tradition. Each language is the civilization of expression in the social systems which use it. Language is the systematization of expression.[14]

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[12] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[14] *Loc. cit.*

It is often assumed that language is thought, and thought language. If this be true, a sentence is the thought. The difficulty with this position is that it cannot admit translation from one language in to another or the use of alternative sentences in the same language. Also, mankind appears to struggle to find words capable of expressing its ideas. Whitehead asks: "If the words and their order together constitute the ideas, how does the struggle arise?" The admission that language is not the essence of thought, does not involve the assertion that thought is independent of language.

> The denial that language is of the essence of thought, is not the assertion that thought is possible apart from the other activities coordinated with it. Such activities may be termed the expression of thought. When these activities satisfy certain conditions, they are termed a language.[15]

Language has been the product of a growing civilization, and civilization is an outcome of language. The retention of thought, the easy recall of thought, communication of thought, would all be "gravely limited" apart from the function of language. Freedom of thought itself is made possible by language, for through it man is released from the bondage of mood and circumstance.

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

The language of sound is speech; the language of sight is writing. Writing is a factor in human experience comparable to the steam engine. "It is important, modern and artificial."[16] Speech is ancient and one of the primary factors constituting human nature. Though writing makes expression of human experience possible when speech is denied, speech has been one of the leading factors in the "rise" of humanity. "Speech is human nature itself, with none of the artificiality of written language."[17]

Language arose in a particular situation which had a dominating reference. Whether the language were a signal or an emotional expression, it was, as Whitehead says: ". . . this reaction to that situation in this environment."[18] Language, in its early history, would have directed attention to those birds, on that tree, at that time. The genus "bird" was an undiscerned meaning.

Language, in the course of centuries, conveys more abstract meanings: i.e., meanings increasingly removed from particular environments. One of the most unfortunate results of modern culture's inheritance from past civilization is the fact that defective insights of the earlier periods have been transferred in language and literature, for " . . . language dictates our unconscious presuppositions of thought."[19] This is evidenced by the use of single words, each with an isolated dictionary meaning, which suggest the possibility of their being used in complete abstraction from the environment. The result of this use of language may imply that the task of philosophy is to understand the interrelation of things, each understandable apart from reference to anything else. This fallacy is what Whitehead elsewhere terms, "Misplaced Concreteness."[20] In contrast to written language, the significant factor about speech is that it retains its reference to some "particularity of environment." The phrase, "a warm day," may be given a general meaning by referring to a dictionary, but experience indicated by the words, "a warm day," is very different for an Eskimo within the Arctic Circle and for a Southern Californian. Nevertheless, there is some identity of meaning: "Nothing too much."

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[16] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

The function of language is to convey the identities on which knowledge is based, and in order to do so language presupposes the particularity of reference to the environment which is the "essence of existence." Speech is immersed in the immediacy of social intercourse; written language is an abstraction from "insistent surroundings." When a book is read aloud, the immediacy of environment enters into the written abstraction.

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[19] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

[20] S. M. W., pp. 75 ff.

Notwithstanding all the dangers of linguistic abstraction, this abstraction is responsible for the final rise of civilization. Language gives expression to conceptual experiences which are latent in nature and largely undiscovered by the conventional conformity of man to his immediate "facts." These conceptual experiences are coordinated in the life of man and express themselves throughout his environment.

Whitehead is skeptical about the obviousness of meanings claimed for language. He does not disparage the validity of language; he cautions the thinker to remember that it is always a tool and thus its use is not necessarily skillful and accurate. Language and civilization are indebted to one another; the flowering of one without the other is inconceivable. Whitehead's appreciation of language is here evidenced:

> Its final conclusion respecting human nature, is that the mentality of mankind and language of mankind created each other. If we like to assume the rise of language as a given fact, then it is not going too far to say that the souls of men are the gift from language to mankind.

The account of the sixth day should be written, He gave them speech, and they became souls.[21]

II. THE SYMBOLIZATION PROCESS

Symbolism is employed in the perceptive mode of symbolic reference. Symbolic reference is a mixed mode of perception which arises from a fusion of the two pure modes of causal efficacy and presentational immediacy. Perception, in the mode of causal efficacy, produces percepta which are vague and carry a feeling of derivation from the immediate past and a feeling of passage into the future. It is ". . . our general sense of existence, as one item among others, in an efficacious actual world."[22] Perception, in the mode of presentational immediacy, finds its percepta distinct, clear, and immediate with a minimum of reference to the past or future. "We are subject to our percepta in the mode of efficacy, we adjust our percepta in the mode of immediacy."[23]

In most cases of perception, symbolic reference is the elucidation of the percepta of causal efficacy by the "fluctuating intervention" of percepta in the mode of presentational immediacy. However, Whitehead notes that this reference acts both ways in complex human experience. From this notion of a two-way aspect of symbolic reference, Whitehead's theory of symbolism is constructed.

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[21] Ibid., p. 57.

[22] P. R., p. 271.

[23] Loc. cit.

After this prefatory explanation, we must start from

> a formal definition of symbolism: The human mind is functioning symbolically when some components of its experience elicit consciousness, beliefs, emotions, and usages, respecting other components of its experience. The former set of components are the 'symbols,' and the latter set constitute the 'meaning' of the symbols. The organic functioning whereby there is transition from the symbol to the meaning will be called 'symbolic reference.'[24]

The requisites for symbolism are two species of percepta and a common ground in order for correlation to take place.

> Then there is 'symbolic reference' between the two species when the perception of a member of one species evokes its correlate in the other species, and precipitates upon this correlate the fusion of feelings, emotions, and derivate actions, which belong to either of the pair of correlates, and which are also enhanced by this correlation.[25]

The species from which symbolic reference starts is called the "species of symbols"; the species at which it ends is termed the "species of meaning." For example, the greyish shape perceived in the mode of presentational immediacy is a symbol for the real stone perceived by causal efficacy. There is no inherent distinction between the sort of percepta which are symbols and the sort which are meanings. Assuming a common ground, the experiential process which constitutes the subject determines whether there shall be symbolic reference at all, and if so, it also determines which percepta will be symbols and which meanings.

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[24] S., pp. 7 f.

[25] P. R., p. 274.

Linguistic symbolism is very complex. A word is a symbol, but a symbol can be written or spoken. A written word may suggest the corresponding spoken word, and the sound may suggest a meaning.

> In such an instance, the written word is a symbol and its meaning is the spoken word, and the spoken word is a symbol and its meaning is the dictionary meaning of the word, spoken or written.[26]

Often a written word effects its purpose without the intervention of the spoken word. Thus the written word symbolizes the dictionary meaning. Sometimes the written word suggests both the spoken word and the meaning. Also, human experience may begin with a spoken word which elicits a visual perception of a written word.

A spoken word is not one definite sound; each instance of its utterance varies in some respect. Thus a spoken word is a species of sounds with specific identity and in individual differences. When one recognizes the species, one has heard the word. What one hears is the sound, heard in the mode of immediacy. The word, "forest," is a symbol. The meaning of the word is directly known by memory or it is vaguely known " . . . by its dated spatio-temporal nexus with events which are directly known."[27] In either case there is a chain of symbolic references whereby there is a "faintly relevant nexus" between the "forest" in the occasion of utterance, and the "event."

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[26] S., p. 11.

The subject assigns which species is to act as a symbol and which as a meaning. The word "forest" may suggest memories of forests; but either the sight or the memory of forests may suggest the word "forest." Ordinarily one does not think of things symbolizing words, mainly for pragmatic reasons. Symbols are much handier than meanings. Thus the word "forest" can be used at will but only in certain occasions can a forest be experienced. "Language almost exclusively refers to presentational immediacy as interpreted by symbolic reference."[28] Language is a handy instrument to furnish communication along the " . . . successive occasions of the historic route forming the life of one individual."[29]

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[27] P. R., p. 276.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 263.

The importance of this notion of language, as furnishing communication in the process of human experience, is seen by its consequent use in Whitehead's conception of interpersonal communication. The problem of communication is one of the most crucial of our time. The scientific empiricist, on the basis of associational psychology and atomistic logic, is plagued by the problem of solipsism. Whitehead, on the basis of the theory of knowledge and the theory of symbolism described above, solves this problem of communication by an extension of this "intra-occasional" communication to interpersonal communication. There may be a two-way system of symbolic reference involving two persons, A and B. A certain forest, recalled to memory by A, symbolizes the word "forest" for A; then A for his own sake and for B's sake, pronounces the word "forest." Then by what Whitehead calls "the efficacy of environment and of B's bodily parts," the word "forest" is perceived by B in the mode of immediacy, and eventually by symbolic reference B vaguely recollects forest scenes. This somewhat drawn out process is almost instantaneous in actual experience.

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[29] Ibid., p. 277.

In this use of language for communication between two persons, there is in principle nothing which differs from its use by one person for communication along the route of his own actual occasions.[30]

A common philosophical error is that of assuming there is one and only one meaning to a sentence. Meaning is always contextual requiring an "indicative system" of relations. Symbols, such as words, are combined into verbal statements in order to convey propositions. How does a spoken language convey the meaning of a proposition? An illustration of a red book will serve to clarify Whitehead's own explanation.[31] A spoken language is merely a series of squeaks. Its function is (1) to arouse in the prehending subject (s) some physical feeling indicative of the logical subject (book) of the proposition, "the book is red"; (2) to arouse in S some physical feeling which plays the part of "'physical recognition'" (a physical feeling involving the eternal object, "redness"); (3) to promote the sublimation of the physical feeling involving the eternal object "redness" into the conceptual "'predicative feeling'" (a feeling derivative from #2); (4) to promote the integration of the indicative feeling, that of the book, with the predicative feeling, red, into the required propositional feeling in the subject S.

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[30] Ibid., p. 278.

[31] Ibid., pp. 403 f.

In this complex function there is always a tacit reference to the environment of the occasion of utterance. The proposition, "this book is red," may mean "it is red" in which the word, "book," may promote a physical feeling indicating the "it" which is red. Also, the proposition may mean "it is bookish and red" when "bookish" is an additional element in the predicative pattern. The predicative patterns, "red" or "bookish and red," do not mean "red" (or "bookish and red") in any possible world, but "red" in this world. The environment may be even more narrow: "red" might mean red under this particular light in this particular room. The statement, "the book is red" may refer to a number of different meanings, all of which depend upon the environment and the occasion of utterance for their meaning.

III. LINGUISTIC EXPRESSION OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

"Expression is the one fundamental sacrament. It is the outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace."[32] In the process of forming an expression of direct intuition, the first stage is that of expression into " . . . some medium of sense experience which each individual contributes at first hand."[33] This expression is wholly personal, " . . . it is the contribution of each to the knowledge of all."[34] This primary stage of expression is usually in action and words, but art may also be employed.

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[32] R. M., p. 131.

The fact that these are expressions implies that they are interpretable. These expressions are interpretable in terms of the "intuition of the recipients."[35] If this notion of interpretability is denied, these modes then remain accidents, irrationalized occurrences of mere sense experience. Through interpretation:

> . . . the recipient extends his apprehension of the ordered universe by penetrating into the inward nature of the originator of the expression. There is then a community of intuition by reason of the sacrament of expression proffered by one and received by another.[36]

Whitehead does not elucidate this point either by illustration or by technical discussion. Here, an illustration and a technical description will be offered. A New Testament passage will serve as the expression whose meaning is to be communicated: "Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin: yet I say unto you, that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these."[37] It is impossible to determine the exact experiences in Jesus' life which formed the more immediate complex of experiences out of which this intuition of a character in the universe arose. Nevertheless, these words awaken in modern man a poignant awareness of the contrast between artificiality and natural unpretentious achievement. Modern man finds in this apprehension of a character in the universe, a penetration into " . . . the inward nature of the originator of the expression."[38] There is a community of intuition, by reason of the sacrament of expression offered by Jesus, received by modern man.

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[33] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

[34] *Loc. cit.*

[35] *Loc. cit.*

[36] *Loc. cit.*

How can this theory of intuitive communication be related to Whitehead's general theory of symbolism? Are Jesus' words species of symbols or species of meanings? The words could be either, in terms of his theory. Probably Whitehead would answer that, like a poet,[39] some of Jesus' experiences called forth the interpretation quoted above.

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[37] Matthew 6:28, 29.

[38] R. M., p. 132.

[39] S., p. 12.

Thus the spoken words were the meaning of the experience; the experiences were the symbols. Jesus' relations with people were the "species of symbols"; his words were "species of meanings"; for modern man, the written words are the symbols for the meaning.

The expressive sign, either a word or an action, is more than interpretable; it is creative as well. "It elicits the intuition which interprets it."[40] To illustrate this notion, Whitehead gives the example of a tuning fork which can elicit a response from a piano. In order for this to be possible, the piano string must have been tuned to the same note. In like manner, the expressive sign elicits the existent intuition which would not otherwise emerge into individual distinctiveness. To revert to the saying of Jesus contrasting the lilies and Solomon, this insight, in the form of either spoken or written words, is creative. It awakens in modern man an intuition which interprets it. Without this expression the particular awareness would not emerge into "individual distinctiveness."

There is very little of what Whitehead calls "really first-hand expression." Most expression is responsive; it evokes the intuition expressed by others. This is not lamentable because what is permanent and significant receives more and clearer delineation. Nevertheless, Whitehead warns that more is needed than responsive expression; man is so used to learned literature and to imitative conduct that novel intuitions seldom have the soil necessary for their fruition. Novel intuitions are responded to and analyzed in terms of their relationships to other ideas, ". . . but as individual primary intuitions within their own province of experience they are not surpassed."[41] The intuitions of Jesus, Shakespeare, Socrates, and Dante will not be surpassed; something has been added once and for all. "We develop in connection with them, but not beyond them . . ."[42] Their peculiar originality is ". . . the very element in their expression which remains unformalized."[43] They deal with what men know, yet they "make it new." The barbaric splendor of Solomon's court and what lilies were like was common knowledge long before Jesus' time, yet the peculiar formulation is unique; the novelty lies in the ability of the new expression to evoke the proper response. What is true of Jesus' insights is also true of those of Shakespeare, Dante, Lao Tze, and others.

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[40] R. M., p. 133.

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[41] Ibid., p. 134.

[42] Ibid., p. 135.

[43] Ibid., p. 136.

Since religious expression fosters a community of intuition, what is the function of dogma?[44] The formulation of dogma increases vividness of apprehension; it helps to clarify understanding of what is seen. Every dogma which formulates, with some adequacy, the facts of complex religious experience is fundamental for the person concerned, and he ignores it "at his peril." The "peril" consists in the loss of aid for the growth of a mature religious consciousness. The function of the dogmas of religion is to clarify the mode of external expression. They are what Whitehead terms, in metaphysics, "the larger generalities." The intolerant abuse of religious dogmas has nearly destroyed their use in large areas of the civilized world.

In the expression of dogma, the solitariness of religious experience returns to society. Even for these individual intuitions, outward expression is necessary ". . . as a sacrament in which the minister and the recipient are one."[45] What is known privately is publicly verified. The conviction of the moment becomes justified as a rational principle. The dogmas of religion are statements as to how the complex world is to be expressed from the standpoint of the intuitions fundamental to religion.

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[44] It may be objected that a discussion of dogma should have been treated in the previous chapter under the general section, "Truth Criteria for Religious Insight." The reason for not doing so is that the linguistic function of dogma could only be considered after a discussion of Whitehead's theory of symbolism.

> . . . the simplicity of inspiration has passed from its first expression into responsive experience. It then disengages itself from particular experience by formulation in precise dogmas, and so faces the transformations of history.[46]

Theologians forget that the importance of religion does not consist in its attempt to formulate systematic finalities; rather, its importance rests in its emphasis that more can be known than can be formulated in one finite system of abstractions. The final principle of religion consists in the conviction that there is a wisdom in the nature of things, from which comes direction for practical living and the possibility of system building.

> It [religion] grounds this principle upon two sources of evidence, first upon our success in various special theoretical sciences, physical and otherwise; and secondly, upon our knowledge of a discernment of ordered relationships, especially in aesthetic valuations, which stretches far beyond anything which has been expressed systematically in words.[47]

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[45] Ibid., p. 137.

[46] Ibid., p. 138.

[47] Ibid., p. 143.

This discernment of relationships is an insight into the very heart of reality. The discernment, as noted in the above quotation, is formed especially in the "aesthetic valuations," which offers further evidence for the notion of a rightness in things as being primarily an aesthetic conception of order. The formulations, on the other hand, are the "froth upon the surface." Dogmas are of no value for inspiration; religions commit suicide if they attempt to find inspiration in their dogmas. The inspiration of religion is in the " . . . primary expressions of the intuitions of the finest types of religious lives."[48] Whitehead is not closing the canon to other works of inspiration, for he notes that the sources of religious belief are always growing, even though "some supreme" expressions are in the past. The records of these sources " . . . elicit in us intuitive response which pierces beyond dogma."[49]

What then is the value of dogmas if they are "froth upon the surface"? Even though inspiration cannot be found in the dogma, it is still necessary. Full expression is not possible through the medium of dogmatic formulations, but ". . . . whatever has objective validity is capable of partial expression in terms of abstract concepts . . ."[50] A coherent doctrine clarifies the world beyond the locus of the origin of the dogma in question. These attempts at exact statements of a theoretical nature can be identified under a variety of circumstances.

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[48] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[49] *Loc. cit.*

> Accordingly, though dogmas have their measure of truth, which is unalterable, in their precise forms they are narrow, limitative and alterable; in effect untrue, when carried over beyond the proper scope of their utility.[51]

The New Testament contrast of Solomon's artificial glory as against the charm of a simple lily will again serve as an illustration to point up the function of dogma. Out of the full complex detail entertained by the subject in contemplation of this saying of Jesus, a single proposition may be abstracted[52] and decided upon affirmatively in the form of a derivative judgment--"naturalness is more conducive to beauty of character than worldly aggressiveness." The abstractness of this statement, in comparison with the source from which it is derived, clearly indicates Whitehead's insight in contending that religious inspiration cannot be found in dogma but rather in the sayings of the religions' founders.

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[50] *Loc. cit.*

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 145.

[52] There may be a large number of propositions abstracted for purposes of judgment.

The ambiguousness of the words in the above derivative judgment, especially that of "naturalness" and "aggressiveness," illustrates the importance of a context in which those words have definiteness. The symbol "naturalness" may suggest memories of people, or the manner of those immediately present. The contextual process of finding meaning occurs in the case of both written and spoken dogmas. In either instance, the process of "intra-occasional" communication, along the historic route of a person's life, takes place in the inter-personal communication of the dogmas.

The value of such abstractions is in their generality --in the light of such a formulation, other comparisons and evaluations are possible. Abstractions are "froth" compared to the richness of the original insight, yet they have their own value. Dogma clarifies the mode of external expression and gives perspective to the particular expression of intuition. The cited conviction of the moment, expressed in symbols by Jesus, becomes a rational principle subject to public knowledge, due to its formulation into dogma. By such formulation, religious conviction, both within and without one's own tradition, can be evaluated; dogma clarifies the world beyond the locus of its own origin. Whitehead does not minimize the importance of dogma but he will never permit his reader to forget that "Dogmatics" is not the source of religious inspiration.

> A system of dogmas may be the ark within which the Church floats safely down the flood-tide of history. But the Church will perish unless it opens its windows and lets out the dove to search for an olive branch. Sometimes even it will do well to disembark on Mount Ararat and build a new altar to the divine Spirit--an altar neither in Mount Gerizim nor yet at Jerusalem.[53]

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[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 145 f.

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CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS OF WHITEHEAD'S ANALYSIS

I. SUMMARY

This inquiry into Professor Whitehead's analysis of the cognitive function of religious intuition can be briefly summarized. First, neither religious nor scientific experience is explainable on the basis of a direct observation of what is immediately present to the senses. What is so present is not only obvious, but trivial as well. Conversely, the important aspects of experience are vague. Vagueness is characteristic of perception in the mode of causal efficacy, which mode accounts for causation, duration, and the possibility of giving meaning to what is present to the senses. "Sense perception" is only one aspect of the knowing process; it is the tool of practical reason. Speculative reason attempts to harmonize the data of experience giving a metaphysical foundation to both science and religion.

Second, the problem of knowledge must be set in an organismic universe. If a "society" theory of reality is denied, two epistemological abstractions are left, a subject and an object, which are both self-contained and cannot be satisfactorily related. In religious epistemology, God, man, and the universe are not ultimately separable; they are organically related.

Third, religion is inescapably philosophical. All phases of religious experience presuppose the value of the individual, that of other persons, and that of the objective universe. The way these three value concepts are related is decided in the actual moment of religious experience. Reality is presupposed to be knowable and worth knowing.

Fourth, religious experience cannot be described apart from a recognition of intuitive elements. These intuitive elements are not left as vague feelings, but are given definition as forms of judgment which elicit actual and potential relationships among the higher phases of human experience. Intuitions give content to the value presuppositions of religious experience: that of the individual, of other persons, and of the objective universe.

Fifth, intuition, as a judgment, has a "rightness in things" as its object. This rightness in things is a harmony of order and novelty apparent in the experiences of daily life. The distinctively religious aspect of this intuition is the judgment of the particular event or events in the light of the ideal relevant to them. The rightness in things is a character inherent in the nature of things. Religious intuition is not an intuition of a personal God;

the concept of God is a derivative judgment.

Sixth, the idea of God is the result of the inferential process whereby the intuitions of order and contrast are combined into a system, and given stable meaning. Out of the full complex of detail relating a proposition and a nexus, which is characteristic of these intuitions, the proposition is abstracted and becomes a derivative judgment. This derivative judgment is ultimately converted by the inferential process into a true or false statement, and is either included or rejected from the system (it is possible for the system to be revised to account for the new judgment). Out of the formulation of the system, the concept of God arises and retains its meaning in terms of the system.

Seventh, the problem of inter-personal communication is no different from that of the "intra-occasional" communication in the life of the individual. This notion of communication rests upon the organismic theory of experience whereby individuals are mutually interactive aspects of the novel emergent universe. The expressions of religious intuition, elicit intuitive responses, and there is thus formed a community of intuition in which the communicant penetrates into the life of the communicator.

Eighth, the problem of meaning must always be dealt with in terms of a context, either spoken or written.

Philosophical and religious thought has too often equated a proposition with a sentence, assuming that a form of words is an adequate expression of a proposition. This assumption is not warranted for it ignores the importance of the context which alone gives determination to the words. A consequent error is to assume that there is only one meaning for a sentence; there may be as many meanings for a sentence as there are contexts in which the sentence is used.

Summarily, Whitehead divides the knowing process into three aspects: the scientific, the religious, and the metaphysical. The scientific aspect of the knowing process describes the nature of the world present to the senses. Religious knowledge seeks the harmony of thought with the sensitive reactions to the data out of which the experience originates; it is concerned with the formation of the experiencing subject. Metaphysical knowledge is the result of Adventures of Ideas that relate all the data of human experience in terms of a speculative system, which system gives religious and scientific knowledge a more concrete setting.

II. IMPLICATIONS FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

A criticism of Whitehead's analysis of the cognitive function of religious intuition is its lack of detail. Frequently important issues are dropped after a sentence or two. For example, the relation of religion to value theory is merely mentioned in undeveloped suggestions at several points in _Religion in the Making_.[1] However, what is not said cannot be criticized; only the lack of detail can be lamented.

The fragmentary character of certain portions of any study made of Whitehead's theory of religion is due to his own method; namely, concern with general principles. In discussing his treatment of religion one weaves fragments together in ways which appear to cast light on central issues. Hence a detailed systematic criticism cannot be given of his use of religious intuition. What can be discussed are the flashes of insight which he throws upon the problems of religious knowledge. It is of these insights that religious thought must become cognizant.

Intuition and Judgment. One of Whitehead's contributions to religious knowledge is his broadening of the term "judgment" to include judgments which are not primarily "true" of "false." Intuition serves in the capacity of a judgment and in his treatment of it he claims that it is not necessarily a judgment of truth or falsity; judgments are usually of the "suspense-form." If the function of religious intuition were only to pass judgments of truth or falsity, it could never be an adequate instrument of religious insight. A Christian meditating on the Gospels is not simply judging what he reads as true or false; he is receiving pictures of concrete life situations in which relevant alternatives are important. Judgments of truth and falsity are not concerned with alternatives; their function is to determine what is the case. In the development of character, the consideration of potential choices is of basic importance and such reflection is precluded by judgments of truth or falsity. For example, in Jesus' words contrasting Solomon's artificial glory with that of a simple lily, the judgment of truth or falsity is largely irrelevant. To be sure, the comparison is conformal or non-conformal but the importance of the comparison is far greater as a "lure for feeling" than as material for judgments of truth or falsity. One is not judging these words to be true or false; he is primarily considering contrasts. The truth or falsity of the contrast is secondary to his purpose. Thus the important question for religious thinking is not solely one of truth, but one of value as well;

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[1] _Ibid_., pp . 59 f.

value is the larger category and thus it includes truth. This is evident from what has been said regarding the consideration of laternatives. Negative and affirmative judgments are irrelevant for the consideration of alternatives, whether in the formulation of scientific hypothesis or in the weighing of moral decisions.

Intuition and Feeling. Religious intuition is the starting point for the Philosophy of Organism. An example of the function of religious intuition is Whitehead's use of the first line of the hymn: "Abide with me; fast falls the eventide."[2] In this hymn is formulated the "complete problem of metaphysics," which is the relation of permanence and flux. The issue appears to be sharpened in religious sensitivity. "The best rendering of integral experience, expressing its general form divested of irrelevant details, is often to be found in the utterances of religious aspiration."[3] The ordered contrast of these two elements of experience is ". . .an almost perfect expression of the direct intuition from which the main position of the Platonic philosophy is derived."[4] One of the reasons metaphysics is often barren Whitehead thinks, is due to its neglect of the elements of feeling; one form of comparative feeling is that of intuition. The Philosophy of Organism is a "critique of pure feeling" constructed out of the feeling structure of experience.[5] Any attempt to disparage the importance of feeling is done on the basis of misguided metaphysics; a metaphysics which is adequate for some limited purposes but fails to encompass the full data of experience. Philosophy and theology have both tended to bifurcate experience, leaving feelings unconsidered, and have concentrated upon the abstractness of logical "facts." By so doing, they have neglected much of the emotional texture of experience without which "facts" could not be apprehended.

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[2] P. R. p. 318.

[3] Loc. cit.

[4] Ibid., pp. 318 f.

The contribution of Whitehead's analysis of feeling is not so much in the ponderous details of his theory of feelings,[6] as in the flash of insight which led him to utilize what other thinkers by-pass. Religious philosophy, in reaction to Schleiermacher's use of feeling, has been hesitant at using the concept of "feeling" because of its nebulousness. Contemporary philosophy of religion has largely ignored the general notion due to its association with a type of feeling-experience which is independent of and prior to judgment. Whitehead's philosophy is an attempt to rescue the concept and put it in a defensible setting whereby light may be thrown on the problems of religion. Thus he does not separate judgment and feeling, but treats them as aspects of organic experience; judgment is a refined form of feeling.

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[5] *Supra*., Chap. II, Sec. IV.

[6] *Loc*. *cit*., P. R., Part III.

Intuition and Aesthetic Order. An intuitive judgment is one of an aesthetic order; Jesus' sayings are like pictures, Whitehead says, for they contain the full complex datum of both the nexus of the logical subject and of the complete proposition itself. The relation of aesthetic order and religious intuition is an undeveloped relation in the thought of Whitehead; it is a relation to which theological attention should be turned. Aesthetics has suffered at the hands of religious thinkers because they have made beauty an instrument of traditional dogmatics; art has been a means for the purveyance of dogma. The reaction to this prostitution of art has tended to make the form of an artistic work altogether separate from a message or content. Whitehead rejects the separation of art from its content, and reverses the first notion which subtends art to the ark of dogma. Out of the awareness of fact (all fact is aesthetic fact) comes an appreciation of order and contrast and their consequent novel entertainment in the life of the processive subject.

Aesthetic process, by which Whitehead does not mean a series of vague sensations of pleasure, is not a wooden process whereby the artist fashions his work according to a pre-established pattern; it is rather an act of spontaneous creativity made possible through a common ground or structure. The artist does not know what he will create until he has created it. Thus structure is not obvious in the process, yet it is that without which the process would not have been possible.

Philosophy of religion is always in danger of crystalizing because it may neglect the creative aspects of experience. Aesthetic experience suggests to the student of religion that in religious experience the character pattern of the experience is not obvious until the particular phases of experience are completed. From the relation of structure and creativity in aesthetic experience, theologians need to be reminded that theology is not religious experience; theology is an attempt to explicate the structural relations which are involved in the experiences themselves. Theologians are always in danger of identifying the creatively religious experiences of life with the structure suggested by a description of the experience. The important point Whitehead contributes is that structure and experience are not separable. Thus there is no recurrence of the notion that religious experience is independent of and prior to judgment.

Intuition and Dogma. Whitehead is well aware that intuition is a very fallible type of judgment. The function of dogma is to increase the reliability of intuition; thus intuitions of the moment become justifiable rational principles. Dogma provides a necessary abstraction with which a clearer insight into religious claims can be gained. Hence common experiences can be identified under a variety of circumstances. Religious intuition, when subject to the inferential process, becomes a dogma which is either true or false. The difference between an intuitive judgment and a dogma is not however in the form of the judgment: i.e., whether it is true, false, or suspended, but in the degree of abstraction involved. An intuitive judgment elicits the "full complex detail" of both the propositions and the nexus in which the logical subjects of the proposition are included; thus abstraction does not take place. A derivative judgment is made in abstraction from the total context because its sole concern is with the truth value of the proposition in question. Thus an intuitive judgment is more concrete than the derivative type.

One of two approaches to this relation of intuition and dogma is usually taken by religious thinkers. One is to treat experience apart from judgments; this results in reducing the knowledge process to an oblong blur. The other method is to make religious experience primarily a matter of judgments of a logical nature with emotional overtones. In contrast to these two approaches, Whitehead suggests an alternative that has two kinds of judgments: the first type is intuitive judgment which carries the full emotional structural detail; the second type is derivative judgment which is an abstractive from the full context and is primarily concerned with the proposition involved. The inspiration and freshness of creative experience are found in the intuitions of everyday experience; the deliberate systematic abstractions, which in turn give meaning to experience, are the derivative disciplines of philosophy of religion.

Most discussions of dogmas, religious or otherwise, neglect the process by which such judgments arise. Theology is usually presented as a system of truths which must be either accepted or rejected; one is a Thomist or he is not, one either accepts the Westminster Confession of Faith or he does not. The humility and acknowledged uncertainty which is so often characteristic of the formulator's mind is largely ignored. The tentativeness of theological formulation is seldom realized, because those subscribing to the creed teach it as something true or false rather than as a speculative venture. The subtle alternatives, the contrasts, the revisions, the original tentativeness have all been crushed and trivialized by scribes. The psychologists are partly right in claiming that there are non-systematic factors which account for the development of the system. However, psychological explanations err in attributing these factors almost exclusively to subjective personal factors, rather than to logical alternatives as well. Whitehead contributes his concept of intuitive suspended judgments as a synthesis of psychological insight and traditional theology. His view is no sterile compromise but a pregnant suggestion as to what these causal factors may be. For example, the traditional claim, "God is love," (probably the most ambiguous subject-predicate symbols in human language) is a judgment which is true or false. A reductively minded psychologist may assert that this statement is but an expression of contented feelings derivative from the immediacy of an idyllic scene. Whitehead contends that out of the entertainment of such happy feelings, intuitive relations are sensed whereby the idyllic scene becomes a symbol for a meaning expressed in the word "love." This feeling has a fluctuating insight which needs to be given stable meaning by reformulation within a system. This feeling-intuition may be given determination by the inferential process whereby the concept of God, an inference from the order and novelty of experience, is selected as one of a potential number of conceptual subjects to be introduced as the logical subject. Thus the concept of God as Love is a derivative derived from intuitions which arose from contemplation of an idyllic scene.

The Symbol-Meaning Relationship. The problem of the communication of knowledge is often conceived as one of relating the thought of two or more persons who are considered in abstraction from their context. Whitehead's contribution to the problem is his stress upon contextual factors which are presupposed by communication itself; even the agreement as to a problem presupposes some degree of communication. The claim that inter-personal communication is possible is not a mere assumption in Whitehead's thought. The systematic framework of his speculative method is not a type of obfuscation whereby an assumption is clothed with the dignity of a rational structure. Whitehead's description is an attempt to relate his wider speculative cosmology to this particular problem.

Professor Whitehead's genius is in his refusal to accept superficial commonplaces as the starting point for philosophical investigation. In the problems of religion, God and man are not entities separated by a gulf; in epistemology, the object and the subject are a part of a causally efficacious world; in the area of communication, the communicator and the communicant are creative factors in an organic setting. Whitehead's method of setting the problem in a concrete fashion is an invaluable technique for religion and philosophy to utilize. Primarily, Whitehead's greatness is in his methodological insight; secondarily, it is in the scope of the speculative structure within which he attempts to include all experience.

Since experience is always of a "togetherness in things," the communication problem cannot be approached without a cosmology which itself includes the expressive aspects of the universe. The implication of this point of view for religious thought is obvious: religious communication presupposes a "society" theory of reality. The atomistic theory of reality, of the positivistic form of nominalism, is plagued by solipsism and cannot account for communication except by assumption. Neo-supernaturalism is no retreat from the attack of positivism, for these theologians accept a nominalistic view of reason on the one hand, and presuppose a society theory of the Church on the other. Whitehead's suggestion strikes at the root of the difficulty;

for him the problem of communication is contextual. The alternative is "solipsism of the present moment."

One of Whitehead's contributions to the study of symbolism is his emphasis upon a two-way aspect of the symbol-meaning relationships. Most analysts of meaning assume a one-way process whereby language is a symbol for meaning. This one-way process is the common mode of communication; thus, a symbol, "chair," represents an object with four legs, a back, a seat, etc., etc. However, this process does not necessarily account for the origin of the term, "chair." It is highly arbitrary to assume that certain objects on which the human body reposes are given names in a matter of fact naming process. A theory of "association" does not account for the naming process. This assumption of a one-way symbolization process, whereby an object (as a meaning) is assigned a name (as a symbol), is as delightfully unrealistic as the account of Adam naming the creatures of earth. The reverse can just as well be the case. A savage reclining comfortably on a ledge gives vent to his satisfaction with his seat by a sound; the sound would not necessarily be a symbol, it could be a meaning. Very likely, the particular sound would never come to be associated with a certain object unless there were a community of meaning based upon similar reclining experiences, which sounds by common usage come to be symbols for the object. The associational theory of language cannot account for the association of the sound with the object which initially takes place. This is the same problem that Hume faced with causation; though the content is language, the issue is the same: how can language be caused? The associational theory of language cannot account for creativity; it does suggest how conventional patterns are learned and perpetuated.

In religious language, the great intuitions are often expressed as meanings arising from experiences which are their symbols. A poet walks through a green wood and the experience calls forth the word, "forest," which is a meaning; the experience is a symbol. In drama, the words of a play are not necessarily the symbols of the meaning--in a dramatic setting they may be the meaning itself.

The subject determines whether the line, "Abide with me; fast falls the eventide," is a symbol or a meaning. In the case of the composer, the words may have been either. In the case of modern man, a sunset, a funeral, or a memory of either can suggest the words as a meaning of the experiences entertained. On the other hand, the words read in Process and Reality may be symbols for one's intuition of permanence and flux in the universe.

In the preceding paragraph, the conventional divide between personal meaning and public communication of that meaning has been crossed. In the "intra-occasional" communication of an individual, there is nothing which differs from communication between persons. The hymn line, "Abide with me; fast falls the eventide," can be a symbol or meaning in either "intra-occasional" or inter-personal experience. A person returning from a funeral may quote the humn line, and his companion could realize in the words a community of meaning which they both share. In the same circumstances, the person might quote the line as a symbol of the transitory aspects of life; the other might see in the words, with a "shock of recognition," the meaning of the events.

The Community of Intuition. Out of the expression of religious intuition comes a community of intuition which the communicant shares with the communicator. Some of the words written in the Gospels are vivid imaginative sketches which are interpreted in terms of the intuitions of its recipients who extend their insights into the universe by penetration into the life of the initiator of the expression. Thus, there is a community of intuition made possible by expression. The important factor is the intuition of a universal character to the "cosmos," not, primarily, the community of intuition with the agent of the expression. Religion has usually stressed fellowship with Jesus, which would be directly possible if one heard his words, or more indirectly possible if he had written, assuming his writings has been accurately preserved. Even if some of his teachings could be proven genuine, making an intuitive fellowship with Jesus possible, the important question is not one of personalities, but one of content. The Gospels are a priceless gift as they are; the imaginative penetration into the important issues of life elicits, in a creative fashion, intuitions which would probably never come about, but for man's repeated contact with these expressions.

The genius of religious aspiration is in the community of intuition with the creative achievements of the race. The Bible is undoubtedly one of the greatest ideational formative factors, for good or ill, in Western culture; in its positive sense, it is probably the source of much of the inspiration of Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, and others. The point at issue, is not the source, but what the source can contribute to the shaping of character. The community of intuition receives its value not by its historical associations, but by its content.

This discussion has not assumed that the Gospels are wholly comprised of expressions of creative intuitions. The fact is that unless these writers and editors held certain derivative abstractions to be true, the intuitions attributed to Jesus would never have been passed on to history. As is the case in history, dogma soon assumed the place of inspiration and lost its original tentativeness. Dogma has continued to be the central concern of the Church; the sources of the inspiration have been withheld from the laity in some cases, in others the dogmatic abstractions held by the Gospel writers themselves have been so presented to people's minds that the flashes of insight of the parables have all but lain unrecognized. The tragedy of religious creativeness repeats itself: the founder's insights are modified by his disciples and further garbled by successive generations, bequeathing a confused picture to the inheritors of the tradition; yet, if it were not for the original writers and the later editors, history would have left man infinitely poorer in the wisdom of life.

The statement of the dissertation problem was made in the form of two questions which can now be summarily answered: religious judgments, both intuitive and derivitive, do give valid knowledge of a "yes" and "no" form, but their most important function is that of suspending the question of truth or falsity for the purpose of entertaining novelty and contrast out of which creative ideas emerge.

By a two way process of the symbol-meaning relationships, which is controlled by the subject, a community of intuition is established whereby an awareness of a character in the universe is communicated. Whitehead's study of feeling as a cosmis relation suggests that philosophy and theology become concerned with the dynamic emotive factors of experience and construct their systems so as to retain reciprocal relations between the freshness of intuition and the necessary formulation of dogma. Religious intuition expresses the central problem of Reality, the relation of permanence and flux.

> Abide with me;
> Fast falls the eventide.

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